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Abstract
Despite more than a century since the first woman was elected to the U.S. Congress
and women gained the right to vote, women remain underrepresented in Washington D.C.,
making up only about a quarter of lawmakers. In three separate articles, this dissertation
examines gender representation in government and how the multiple identities of women
candidates and politicians impact their electoral experiences and legislative behaviors. This
dissertation examines how gender intersects with parental status, marital status, sexuality,
race, and political party to shape women’s experiences seeking and serving in political office.
I find that while women continue to face obstacles in pursuing elected office and in achieving
their preferred policy outcomes in government, there are also opportunities for women and
other underrepresented groups to gain and exercise political power.
In the first article, I examine candidate parental status and find that voters prefer candi-
dates who are parents but perceive them as having less time and energy to devote to public
service. My second article explores how voters respond to less conventional congressional
candidates and finds that a preference for more conventional candidates is driven by a sense
of shared values, perceived ability to govern, and perceived ideology. Article three looks
at the influence of gender on how members of Congress vote, finding that as the role of
parties has increased, gender has a diminishing impact on voting, even on women’s issues.
Collectively, this timely dissertation is important in understanding why representation in
government matters, what obstacles remain that hinder the further inclusion of more diverse





Having a legislative body that better represents the identities and experiences of the
people it serves has a fundamental influence on public trust in government and what types
of policy issues are debated within the halls of the U.S. Congress. In recent years, we have
witnessed more diverse types of candidates run and win seats in government, increasing our
understanding of how the backgrounds and identities of politicians impact their campaign
strategies, how voters perceive them, and ultimately, their behaviors serving in Congress.
In three separate articles, this dissertation broadly examines representation in U.S. politics.
Specifically, I explore the underrepresentation of women throughout the political process
from women running for office to becoming legislators. Additionally, I aim to go beyond
examining gender as a singular identity but as one that intersects in unique ways with other
identities, including motherhood, political party, and sexuality, to shape candidates’ and
politicians’ experiences and political behaviors.
In Chapter 2, I examine how gender intersects with parental status to influence how voters
perceive different types of political candidates. Specifically, I address if mothers with young
children face electoral disadvantages in running for office. The article explores attitudes
toward parents as political candidates and how that relationship may be conditional on
gender, marital status, and race. I theorize mothers face increased skepticism about their
ability to balance their career and household responsibilities.
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Using a survey experiment, I find respondents favor candidates with young children,
rating parents as more relatable, better on family issues, superior on feminine and masculine
traits, and more liberal. A clear disadvantage parents face is they are perceived as having
less time and energy; however, immune from this parental penalty are White, married men.
Gender and marital status condition parenthood, such that support is greatest for married
mothers and lowest for single men without children. Ultimately, I find mothers do not face
stronger voter biases than fathers, and these results highlight the advantages mothers can
leverage to advance their electoral goals.
Chapter 3 examines how voters use shortcuts, specifically information about candidates’
personal lives, to evaluate political candidates who deviate from those who have historically
served in Congress. Using a conjoint experiment, I vary candidates’ relationship status,
children, and sexuality. I expect voters favor candidates from more traditional backgrounds,
rating them as superior in terms of abilities, values, and perceived ideology.
Overall, I find respondents favor more conventional candidate traits, as respondents pre-
fer straight, married candidates who have older children. Republicans, women, and older
respondents express a stronger preference for these more conventional candidates. At times,
a shared sense of values, perceived ability to govern, and perceived ideology are all factors
that explain this increased preference for more traditional candidates. However, I find that
a sense of shared values with a candidate does not always align with vote choice, as Demo-
cratic respondents perceived they shared fewer values with queer candidates but this did
not decrease the group’s overall willingness to vote for queer candidates, potentially because
they were stereotyped as more liberal. Additionally, I find women respondents express a
stronger preference than men for candidates who are parents.
Furthermore, I find voters’ evaluations of candidates are, at times, conditional on race
and gender. For example, I find candidate gender conditions preferences for parental status,
such that men candidates were evaluated similarly regardless of parental status, where women
candidates were preferred when they had older children. Overall, this project sheds light
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on voters’ willingness to support nontraditional candidates and how this may impact the
advancement of groups historically underrepresented in government.
My final chapter shifts to examine how lawmakers’ identities influence legislative be-
havior. Chapter 4 adopts new methodologies to reevaluate the conventional wisdom that
congressional women are more liberal than their male co-partisans. Using Bayesian item
response theory, I scale legislators on 21 policy topics across 40 years. I expect women
are more liberal in early years but that gender differences have diminished, driven by the
replacement of moderate retirees with ideologically extreme women and a political agenda
that increasingly divides legislators along party lines.
I find House Republican women are more liberal in the 1980s and early 1990s, especially
on women’s issues. However, Speaker Newt Gingrich’s reign marks a shift, such that GOP
men and women are increasingly indistinguishable. Among Democrats, gender differences
arise following the 1992 “Year of the Woman,” such that women voted more liberal. These
differences persisted into 2010s; however, Democratic men and women legislators look more
similar than decades prior. Ultimately, this project exposes how polarization has diminished
gender differences in congressional voting, even on issues where gender has traditionally been
thought of as a pivotal identity in shaping attitudes and policy preferences.
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Chapter 2
How do you do it with Kids?: An
Intersectional Analysis of Mothers Running
for Political Office
2.1 Introduction
“How do you do it with kids?” is a question Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA) says
she often hears on the campaign trail (Schaff & Cochrane 2019). Nebraska state legislator
Megan Hunt shares similar experiences, noting she too is often confronted with inquiries
about her family such as, “If you win and you have to go to Lincoln every day and be in the
capitol, who’s going to take care of your child?” (FiveThirtyEight 2020). Rep. Grace Meng
(D-NY) who would bring her young sons to campaign events, said, “People will say to me,
‘Oh we didn’t vote for you to be a babysitter,’ where I don’t sense [that] the same thing is
said to men.” (Dittmar, Sanbonmatsu & Carroll 2018, pg. 79). Comments like these are
just a small example of the environment mothers with young children face when running for
political office. While 2018 and 2020 were record-breaking years for the number of women
running for and elected to public office, there continues to be few mothers of young children
within Congress. Compared to more than 100 men, only 25 women in the 116th Congress
had school-aged children (Akin 2019).
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As women are increasingly seeking political leadership, more women candidates are
openly embracing motherhood on the campaign trail. For example, in 2018, Rep. Mikie
Sherrill (D-NJ), brought her young children along with her to campaign events, and Zephyr
Teachout ran for New York attorney general while visibly pregnant (Zernike 2018). Following
the 2018 elections, former congressional candidate Liuba Grechen Shirley started the first po-
litical action committee devoted to helping mothers run for political office, and in Congress,
Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz (D-FL) created the Moms in the House Caucus to bring
together young mother lawmakers (Gibson 2019, Pepitone 2019). Past research finds that
having mothers represented within the halls of Congress matters, as mothers are more likely
to prioritize legislation on family and child policy issues (Bryant & Marin Hellwege 2019).
To understand why there are so few mothers of young children in Congress, this paper
examines how voters evaluate parents running for office, conditional on gender, marital
status, and race. Ample research has explored preferences for women candidates, but we
still have much to learn about how gender intersects with other identities to shape voter
preferences. As an individual’s identities increasingly deviate from the stereotypical image
of a politician, they are more likely to face uncertainty from voters about their strengths
and overall ability to serve in political leadership. Specific to parenthood, stereotypes that
women do or should do the bulk of household chores and child care responsibilities results in
mothers running for office facing more questions from voters than fathers do about their time,
energy, and abilities to serve in public office. I expect that while women with young children
will face skepticism from voters about serving in office while also raising young children, male
candidates will not face the same apprehension. Broadly, I expect parental status has four
main influences on how voters evaluate a candidate – overall ability, relatability, character
traits, and ideology.
Furthermore, much of the past research on parenthood and candidates hinges on the
experiences of White, married mothers. This project aims to examine how parenthood
intersects with other candidate identities including marital status and race. Specifically,
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because of the negative stereotypes of Black and single mothers, I expect these candidates will
be increasingly disadvantaged as compared to White or married mothers of young children.
To explore attitudes toward candidates with young children, I use a survey experiment on
a high-quality sample, presenting respondents with a mock news article featuring a candidate
running in a congressional primary race. Within the news story, the candidate’s children,
gender, race, and relationship are randomized. Overall, I find respondents are more likely to
support candidates with young children as compared to those with no children. Respondents
rated candidates with young children as more relatable, better able to address issues impor-
tant to families, more warm, superior on both traditionally feminine and masculine character
traits, and overall more liberal. These stereotypes may help or harm candidates based on
their specific electoral context. However, a key disadvantage young parents face from voters
is that parents are perceived to have less time and energy to devote to public service as
compared to candidates without children. This disadvantage for having young children is
consistent across gender, race, and relationship status; however, the one group immune from
this parental disadvantage is White, married men. While I find limited differences based on
a candidate’s race, I do find gender and marital status interact with parenthood to influ-
ence voters’ evaluations. Across all groups, respondents most favored married mothers and
least favored single men who do not have children. This research builds on the breadth of
literature devoted to exploring the opportunities and obstacles there are for campaigns of
candidates who deviate from the “ideal” image of a politician. Specifically, by exploring how
parenthood impacts how voters perceive candidates, this project aims to examine how the
multiple identities of women candidates shape success at the ballot box.
2.2 Mothers as Political Candidates
While the number of women in politics has been on the rise, in 2019, women made up only
24% of Congress and 29% of state legislatures (CAWP 2019a, CAWP 2019b). An impediment
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to the further inclusion of women in politics is that women with political ambition, more
often than men, wait until their children are grown before considering a run for office, stifling
opportunities to advance to higher office (Carroll & Sanbonmatsu 2013, Conway, Steuernagel
& Ahern 2005, Fulton, Maestas, Maisel & Stone 2006). Deason, Greenlee, and Langner
(2015) coined the concept “Politicized Motherhood,” arguing that motherhood structures
all aspects of women’s pursuit of elected office, including when they decide to run, how they
frame their campaign, and how they are perceived by voters.
Both in the United States and globally, women politicians are less likely than their male
colleagues to have children and are more likely to be unmarried, likely due to women making
the decision to limit family responsibilities so they can pursue their career goals (Carroll &
Sanbonmatsu 2013, Deason, Greenlee & Langner 2015, Joshi & Goehrung 2020). Interviews
with candidates find women more often mention balancing home life and career goals as a
challenge in pursuing elected office (Gaddie 2003). This phenomenon has materialized in
state legislatures, where women are less likely than men to run in districts furthest away
from the state capital, as this requires them to spend more time away from their families
(Silbermann 2015). Counter to this narrative, some research does find one’s marital or
parental status does not predict likelihood of running for political office (Fox & Lawless 2014).
Scholarship on parents running for office finds discernible differences in how men and
women candidates choose to disseminate family details to voters. Men running for of-
fice are more likely than women to emphasize their family on their campaign websites,
advertisements, and Twitter (Bystrom, Banwart, Robertson & Kaid 2004, Campbell &
Cowley 2018, Cook 2016, Thomas & Lambert 2017). Interviews with women candidates
highlight they make strategic choices in how they frame their family in their campaign
because they perceive voters will view mothers and fathers differently. For example,
women candidates worry that while fathers of young children running for office will be
thought of as charming and more relatable, mothers are often confronted with questions
about how they will possibly manage their work-life balance (Neklason 2018, Stalsburg &
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Kleinberg 2016, Zernike 2018).
Analysis of campaign speeches finds women are more likely to talk about their families
than are men, but that doing so hurts them electorally as women discussing their home life
runs counter to traditional views of strong political leadership (Gimenez, Karpowitz, Monson
& Preece N.D.). Legislative staffers articulate they feel the media is hyper-focused on the
family situations of women politicians, and evidence suggests their intuition is correct as
women candidates receive more media coverage of their families than men (Burge, Hodges &
Rinaldi 2020, Niven & Zilber 2001, Smith 2018). Not only do women candidates receive more
overall coverage of their families, but this coverage also tends to take a more negative tone
than coverage of male candidates’ families (Burge, Hodges & Rinaldi 2020). Additionally,
over the past several decades, analysis of media coverage and campaigns finds increasing
references to candidates’ family dynamics (Elder & Greene 2012). Therefore, regardless of
if a voter bias against women with young children exists or not, candidates certainly seem
to be acting in a way that reflects that they perceive voters will punish women candidates
with young children.
Experimental work finds voters tend to favor married candidates that have children, as
parenthood reflects traditional values, cultural norms, and serves as an indicator that the
candidate understands and will prioritize family policy issues (Barbara Lee Family Founda-
tion 2017, Bell & Kaufmann 2015, Campbell & Cowley 2018, Greenlee 2014, Stalsburg 2010,
Teele, Kalla & Rosenbluth 2018). This voter bias in favor of candidates with traditional
families disproportionately impacts women as women, on average, still perform a majority
of household chores and child care (Hook 2017, Teele, Kalla & Rosenbluth 2018). Therefore,
this leaves mothers, as compared to fathers, with less time to devote to their political aspira-
tions (Teele, Kalla & Rosenbluth 2018). For example, per a 2010 survey of U.S. parents with
two or more children, women spend nearly double the amount time in their week on child
care as compared to men (OECD family database 2016). Additionally, parenting tasks tend
to be gendered, with mothers doing more of the essential child care tasks, such as cooking or
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making doctor appointments, while fathers do more of the fun, leisure activities with their
children (Musick, Meier & Flood 2016). The COVID-19 pandemic has only exacerbated
this trend, with women being four times more likely than men to leave their jobs because
of children not going to school or doing at-home learning (Gogoi 2020). Running for office
requires long hours and working evenings and weekends, which based on average child care
division of labor, leaves mothers with less time to campaign than fathers, dampening their
electoral goals.
Although voters tend to favor candidates with more traditional families, this perception
is often conditional on gender. Specifically, mothers with young children are electorally
disadvantaged as compared to fathers with young children (Hedlung, Freeman, Hamm &
Stein 1979, Pew Research Center 2008, Stalsburg 2010). These voter biases tend to be
exacerbated within the Republican Party, as conservative voters are the least supportive of
a mother with young children or single women without children running for office, preferring
a mother with adult children (Bell & Kaufmann 2015, Pew Research Center 2008). A
2018 poll found 51% of U.S. adults believe it is better for women to have children before
entering politics or early in their career if they want to reach high political office (Igielnik &
Parker 2019).
A shortcoming of past experimental research on candidates and parenthood is that it
has almost exclusively looked at how respondents perceive White parents, as referenced
by a photo of the hypothetical candidate or using distinctively White names to cue race.
Additionally, much of the popular media features on mothers running for Congress have
predominantly covered the campaign experiences of White mothers. Therefore, we have a
limited understanding of how voters perceive mothers of different ethnicities and races.
Additionally, apart from work at the Barbara Lee Family Foundation, no past research has
examined how perceptions of parenthood hinges on marital status, specifically how married
mothers and single mothers are viewed differently, which this paper aims to tackle. By only
examining the idealized version of motherhood – White, married mothers – most of the past
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work on parenthood and electoral politics draws much of its conclusions on the experiences
on only a subset of parents and fails to consider how other identities may intersect with
parenthood to shape voters’ perceptions and biases. The goal of this project is to more
carefully consider how stereotypes of motherhood may be conditional on other identities and
the impacts this has on candidates’ electoral prospects.
2.3 Theoretical Expectations
Collectively, I expect voters prefer candidates who are married and have children. How-
ever, there may be a subgroup of that preferred group who faces disadvantages from voters
– mothers of young children. In the past several decades, women have increasingly entered
the workforce, and in early 2020, women in the U.S. for the first time, held more jobs than
men did (Kelly 2020). Despite these gains, many still cling to norms of more traditional
family dynamics and gender roles in the home. In a 2013 Pew survey, 51% of respondents
said children are better off with their mother at home, while only 8% of respondents said the
same about fathers (Wang, Parker & Taylor 2013). Therefore, women with young children
often face more societal pressures than men to stay at home with their children.
These gender stereotypes and views of traditional gender roles ultimately influence how
women are perceived when they seek elected office. The characteristics and traits typically
thought to be most necessary for political leadership are often those stereotypically held by
men. Furthermore, voters are more likely to ascribe these leadership traits to male candidates
based solely on their gender. Therefore, women candidates may face a disadvantage as they
do not fulfill the “ideal” vision of who should be a politician in the eyes of some voters, and
women candidates are less likely to be stereotyped as possessing the traits most valued in
politics.
Based on who has historically served in government and who continues to possess a
majority of seats in politics, White, married fathers are likely viewed as the best overall fit
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or ideal image of a politician. Those who deviate from this ideal may suffer from voter biases
about who belongs in politics. Pulling from psychology research, role congruity theory argues
that because of the mismatch between women’s traditional gender roles and the requirements
for political leadership, women are less preferred by voters and are stereotyped as less likely
to possess the skills and traits necessary for success in these leadership positions (Eagly &
Karau 2002).
This often leaves women candidates caught in a catch-22, such that if they fulfill gender
norms, they fail to meet expectations for political leadership, and if they embrace the traits
valued in politics, they fall outside traditional expectations of how women should behave
(Eagly & Karau 2002, Gervais & Hillard 2011). Whereas, in comparison, because stereotyp-
ically masculine traits are more congruent with ideal visions of political leadership, men are
favored for these roles and more positively evaluated once in these positions (Diekman &
Goodfriend 2006). For example, women are stereotyped as more gentle and passive, traits not
typically described as in line with successful political leadership, while men are more likely
to be stereotyped as tough or assertive, characteristics viewed as much more compatible with
political success (Huddy & Terkildsen 1993).
Expanding this theoretical framing to beyond just gender, candidates whose identities
and characteristics increasingly deviate from this “ideal” politician image likely face more
reluctance from voters and greater obstacles to electoral success. Candidates’ personal lives
and family dynamics can lead to stereotypes about their values, skills, and traits. If the ideal
image of a politician is a White, married father, as an individual’s own identities deviates
from this archetype, such as Black, single mothers, the more likely they are to face biases from
voters because they are stereotyped as incongruent with the traits most desired for political
leadership (Hoyt & Burnette 2013). Within the dominant culture in the United States, the
traditional heterosexual nuclear family is viewed as the norm or ideal family, and therefore,
all who deviate from this norm likely face varying negative stereotypes (Ganong, Coleman &
Mapes 1990). Only those perceived to have the ideal family receive an electoral advantage
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from their personal lives, and those who stray from this face voter biases about their fitness
for office and have to make a stronger case to voters about their political leadership skills
and values (Auer, Trimble, Curtin, Wagner & Woodman 2020).
Looking at parents in professional environments more broadly, the stereotypes of par-
enthood are not equally applied to men and women. In the workforce, mothers are of-
ten stereotyped as less committed to their work, less competent, and overly emotional
(Bragger, Kutcher, Morgan & Firth 2002, Correll, Benard & Paik 2007, Masser, Grass &
Nesic 2007, Morgan, Walker, Hebl & King 2013). When women in the workforce become
mothers, they are perceived as less competent than women without children, whereas the
perceived competence of a man is not contingent on his parental status, thus boosting men’s
chances for career advancement (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick 2004).1 Specifically, the stereotypical
traits of motherhood, such as more gentle and warm, are counter to the traits desirable for
political leadership (Huddy & Terkildsen 1993, Smith 2018).
In general, mothers are more harshly judged than fathers for being in the workforce. For
example, stay-at-home mothers are viewed as more likeable and more loving of their children
than working mothers, while judgments of fathers are not conditional on their employment
status (Riedle 1991). This is because mothers in the United States who take too much time
away from their family for professional aspirations violate the expectations of “intensive
mothering,” in which mothers face pressures to commit the largest chunk of their time and
efforts to motherhood and managing the home (Collins 2019).
The stereotype of mothers as less committed to working often does not translate to
fathers, likely due to gender stereotypes that women do or should perform a majority of
household work and child care. The perception that mothers are less committed to their
careers likely shapes voters’ evaluations of women candidates with young children, such that
I expect voters view mothers as having less time than fathers to devote to public service.
Mothers with young children running for office may be viewed as selfish for giving up time
1These stereotypes of motherhood are predominately driven by men (Halpert, Wilson & Hickman 1993).
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with their children to pursue their own professional gains in ways fathers are not. Even if
male candidates have young children, they are not stereotyped as having less time, energy, or
commitment to their work, likely because voters assume a male candidate’s wife is providing
the bulk of the child care.
Furthermore, motherhood may exacerbate the stereotypes women candidates face, creat-
ing additional challenges for mother candidates (Deason, Greenlee & Langner 2015). For ex-
ample, women candidates are often stereotyped as possessing feminine traits, such as warmth
and kindness (Fox & Oxley 2003, Huddy & Terkildsen 1993). Because these traits are also
stereotypes of mothers, voters are increasingly likely to judge women with children as pos-
sessing feminine traits, which may disadvantage them in seeking office, as they are viewed as
less likely to possess the leadership traits necessary for a career in politics and less likely to be
competent in traditionally masculine policy issues (Rosenwasser & Dean 1989, Smith 2018).
When primed to think about feminine stereotypes, voters view women candidates as less
qualified and suffer electorally (Bauer 2015). However, it is also possible that as women
have increasingly had electoral success, this historical disconnect between feminine traits
and political leadership has diminished (Greenlee, Deason & Langner 1996). Especially when
campaigns emphasize feminine policy issues or the office is focused around a feminine policy
area, women may actually be advantaged (Anzia & Bernhard N.D., Fox & Oxley 2003).
In particular, these stereotypes of women and traditional gender roles in the home may
be especially damaging for Republican women running for office with young children. The
Republican Party often frames itself as the party of traditional family values, expressed
through the party’s fight against abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment, and feminism,
as well as its efforts to protect against the erosion of the nuclear family in U.S. culture
(Dowland 2015, Jost, Nosek & Gosling 2008, Mansbridge 2015). While Republican mothers
are just as likely as Democratic mothers to be working, Republican fathers are more likely
than Democratic fathers to believe in traditional parenting and believe that women should
perform a majority of child care responsibilities (Elder & Greene 2016). Because GOP voters
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are more likely to believe in more traditional gender roles, they may be especially critical of
a woman seeking office while she has young children and prefer a woman to wait until her
children are grown before pursuing her political aspirations. This leads to my first set of
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. Men candidates with young children will receive more electoral support than
women with young children.
Hypothesis 2. Candidates with young children will be viewed as having less time and energy
to devote to governing than candidates without children.
Hypothesis 3. Women candidates with young children will be viewed as more warm and
feminine than women without children and men regardless of if they have young children or
not.
Hypothesis 4. Republican respondents will be less likely than Democratic respondents to
support women candidates with young children.
2.3.1 Intersectional Motherhood
Taking up Burge, Hodges & Rinaldi’s (2020) call to take a more intersectional approach to
understanding family dynamics in campaigns, I expect that in addition to gender differences,
race and marital status also condition how voters perceive parents of young children running
for office (Crenshaw 1989). The idealized family is often depicted as two parents who are
straight, cisgender, married, and White (Collins 2012, Johnston & Swanson 2006). Yet,
many children grow up in families that do not fit this strict “ideal,” including single parent
households and Black families, which I examine in this paper.
While I expect married mothers of young children running for office will be viewed as
violating gendered norms and as having less energy for politics, these stereotypes are likely
applied even more harshly to single mothers. I expect single mothers will be judged as having
to devote even more time to their children at the expense of professional success and further
deviate from the ideal image of a politician.
In general, single mothers, as compared to married mothers, are more likely to be nega-
tively stereotyped. For example, single mothers are often evaluated as poor decision-makers
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and as worse mothers to their children than married mothers (Ganong & Coleman 1995). In
2018, approximately 1 in 5 children were living with a single mother, yet Americans continue
to have an overall negative view of single mothers (Livingston 2018). This upward trend of
single mothers has even been publically denounced by politicians. For example, Rick San-
torum during his 1994 Senate campaign said, “We are seeing the fabric of this country fall
apart, and it’s falling apart because of single moms” (Sherman 2018). Focus group partic-
ipants when asked about their opinions on single mothers running for office said they were
concerned about how the campaign could negatively impact their children, which ultimately
could impact one’s willingness to vote for a single mother candidate (Barbara Lee Family
Foundation).
In light of the 2018 “Year of the Woman,” the candidacy of single mothers was highlighted
by major media in the lead up to the 2018 midterm elections. Lily Espinoza Ploski, who
ran for statewide office in California, spoke to reporters about the importance she felt for
more single mothers, like herself, to run for office. Ploski said she feels single mothers are,
“one of the most disenfranchised groups of the population” (Pattillo 2018). Other single
mothers running for office in 2018 articulated how they heard voters’ concerns over their
children and their motherly responsibilities. For example, Katie Wilson, a single mother
who unsuccessfully ran for Congress in New York, said she felt voters made assumptions
about her decision to run for office coming at the expense of neglecting her motherly duties
(Sherman 2018). This leads to my hypotheses about voter perceptions of candidates that
are parents, conditional on marital status.
Hypothesis 5. Married women candidates with young children will receive more electoral
support than single women with young children, while electoral support for male candidates
with young children will not vary by their marital status.
Hypothesis 6. Single women candidates with young children will be viewed as having less
time and energy to devote to governing than married women with young children and men
with young children regardless of if they are married or not.
I also expect race shapes how voters evaluate candidates and parenthood. Black moth-
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ers, both because of their race and gender, deviate from the typical vision of who belongs in
politics. Therefore, I expect Black mothers will be more negatively evaluated as candidates
than are White mothers or fathers. Not only are Black families incompatible with the “ideal”
family because of their race, but also Black women are stereotyped in different ways than
White women, particularly when it comes to motherhood (Foster 2008, Thomas, Wither-
spoon & Speight 2004). For example, White mothers are often stereotyped as more feminine
and more warm, but stereotypes of Black women are often related to their sexuality and
place in the household (Harris-Perry 2011). Therefore, when race is coupled with parental
status information, this likely exacerbates these negative stereotypes.
One of the negative archetypes of Black mothers is that of a welfare queen, that Black
mothers are perceived as lazier, more likely to receive public assistance, and more likely to
have additional children (Ayee, Carew, Means, Reyes-Barrientez & Sediqe 2019, Hancock
2004, Rosenthal & Lobel 2016, Woodard & Mastin 2005). Because Black mothers are more
likely to be characterized in this way, people are less likely to support public assistance to
Black mothers as compared to White mothers (Cassese & Barnes 2019, Gilens 1999). Black
women are also stereotyped as playing a more dominant leadership role in managing their
household than are White women, specifically when it comes to raising children (Chaney
2011, Sewell 2013). Because of this stereotype of the strong Black matriarchy, Black women
are often held more responsible for their children’s failures than are White women (Rosenthal
& Lobel 2016, Woodard & Mastin 2005). These negative stereotypes of Black mothers likely
have implications for Black woman seeking to run for office. Especially for those with young
children, voters are likely to hold more negative views of Black mothers compared to White
mothers.
Hypothesis 7. White women candidates with young children will receive more electoral sup-
port than Black women candidates with young children.
Hypothesis 8. Black women candidates with young children will be viewed as having less
time and energy to devote to governing than White women candidates with young children.
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2.4 Experimental Design
To test my expectations, I ran a survey experiment to gauge responses to political can-
didates and parenthood.2 Respondents were presented with a mock news story about a
candidate running in a U.S. Senate primary election participating in a campaign event. The
candidate was described as either a Democrat or Republican, such that respondents were
evaluating a candidate of their own political party, rather than of the opposite party.3
I chose to frame the scenario as a primary rather than a general election for two reasons.
First, in primaries, voters lack the partisan cue available to them in general elections to
guide their voting decision. Therefore, it is in primaries when I expect candidates’ personal
characteristics matter most in shaping how voters evaluate candidates (Hirano & Snyder Jr
2019, Kirkland & Coppock 2018a). Secondly, in recent United States general elections,
partisanship often trumps most other factors in shaping decisions at the ballot box, and
therefore, I expect the effect of parenthood on voting decisions in general elections is limited,
if not muted entirely.
This experimental design is a 2x2x2x2 design. The vignette randomly varies the can-
didate’s children (none or 2 young children), gender (woman or man), relationship status
(married or single), and race (Black or White).4 Due to the number of treatment groups
and sample size limitations, each respondent throughout the survey was presented with three
separate news stories to evaluate.5 The text of these three news stories varies but was written
to be as similar as possible. They are all approximately the same length, cue the treatment
2This research design was pre-registered with the Open Science Framework.
3Respondents who identified as independent received a follow-up question asking if they had to choose,
do they think of themselves as more similar to Republicans or Democrats and then were assigned to a party
treatment group based on their response to this question.
4For consistency, all candidates are framed as in heterosexual marriages, but I encourage future research
to examine how sexuality conditions perceptions of parenthood. Additionally, because of sample limitations,
the candidate’s race was limited to only Black or White, but I strongly encourage future research to examines
other races and ethnicities in regards to parenthood and political candidacies.
5The news stories were spread out throughout the survey, separated by other unrelated questions to avoid
biasing how respondents evaluate each news article based on the prior news article. The news stories were
always presented in the same order, and there was a separate randomization process for each news article.
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variables in similar ways, and use nonpartisan language.6
Within each news story, the candidate’s first name and pronouns cue the candidate’s
gender. To cue if the candidate had children or not, much of the past experiments on
parenthood have either shown a picture of the candidate’s family or simply mentioned the
candidate has children. However, because there has been a recent shift in candidates being
more open in embracing their families with voters, particularly in media coverage of can-
didates, I chose to have the candidate’s children more active in the individual’s campaign.
Each news story features the candidate at a campaign event and indicates the children
were in attendance, creating the visual of the candidate in practice actually attempting to
balance their professional and personal responsibilities.7 For those without children, the
story explicitly mentions the candidate does not have children, as it is possible respondents
might make assumptions about if a candidate has children or not based on their marital
status. The candidate’s race is cued by their first and last name, as past research finds
using racially distinctive names is an effective way to signal race in experiments (Bertrand &
Mullainathan 2004, Butler & Broockman 2011). To ensure the names cue race and not other
characteristics about the candidate, I used past research to choose names that are nearly
identically perceived as middle class, competent, and warm.8 The candidate’s marital status
is stated as either married or single in the article. To increase the external validity of this
experiment, all other components of the news articles, in particular the quotes, are taken
from actual news coverage of various congressional candidates from both political parties.9
6In each article, the age of the candidate is mentioned to avoid assumptions about the candidate’s age
and to keep it consistent throughout the treatment conditions.
7More traditionally, young children could be considered any school-aged children or those under the age
of 18. However, my expectations are specific to candidates having young children. While I expect that
mothers of high-school aged children may also face pushback, I chose to frame the children as elementary
or pre-elementary aged, because I expect the effects of motherhood to be most prominent with younger
children. There is a perception that younger children require more care and time as compared to high-school
aged children. Additionally, I decided to frame the candidate as having two children as this reflects the
average number of children for women of this age. Based on data from 2014, for mothers in their early 40s,
41% have two children (Livingston 2015).
8See the appendix for a full list of the names used in the experiment, as well as a more detailed description
of the process for selecting names.
9This language is from news article written about Rep. Ayanna Pressley (D-MA), Rep. Abby Finkenauer
(D-IA), Sen. Maggie Hassan (D-NH), Sen. Rick Scott (R-FL), Sen. Doug Jones (D-AL), Sen. Martha
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Experiment Treatment News Articles
[Lillie, Ayanna, Travis, Antoine] [Novak/Smalls] announces bid for
U.S. Senate
[Lillie, Ayanna, Travis, Antoine] [Novak/Smalls], [Republican/Democratic] can-
didate for the U.S. Senate, was out on the campaign trail this week, speaking to
a crowd at the local community center.
[Novak/Smalls], a [married/single] 45-year-old prosecutor, [holding one daughter
on [her/his] hip and another by the hand/ exclude], introduced [herself/himself]
to the crowd. [[Novak/Smalls] does not have children./exclude]
“I’m running because our country needs leaders, not politicians,” [she/he] said.
“[As a single mother,/As a single father,/As a mother and wife,/As a father and
husband,/As a wife,/ As a husband,/exclude] I know we all want the same thing.
We want to work hard and make a good life for our family.”
[Novak/Smalls] said [she/he] decided to jump into this primary race because
[she/he] is ready to serve in Washington D.C. as an advocate and a champion
for [her/his] state in Congress.
[Sharon, Janelle, Charles, Cedric] [Steffen/Washington] launches
campaign for U.S. Senate
[Republican/Democrat] and local former mayor [Sharon, Janelle, Charles, Cedric]
[Steffen/Washington] announced [he/she] is running for the U.S. Senate.
[Steffen/Washington], who is 41 years old, [single/married], with [2 young chil-
dren/ no children], said [she/he] decided to run for the Senate because [he/she]
is ready to fight for [his/her] constituents in Congress.
“Washington D.C. has lost its way on too many of the priorities that matter to
our state,” [Steffen/Washington] said before a crowd of supporters on Tuesday.
“You can count on my commitment to problem-solving.”
[Steffen/Washington], who was joined on stage by [his/her]
[wife/husband/parents] [and children, ages 6 and 2/exclude], said this race
isn’t about [him/her] or [his/her] opponents. “[As a single mother,/As a single
father,/As a mother and wife,/As a father and husband,/As a wife,/ As a
husband,/exclude] I know this race is about your kids, your families, your
future.”
McSally (R-AZ). Before each vignette, respondents were given the following instructions: “Please read the
following news article about a political candidate. After which, you will be asked to evaluate this candidate.”
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[Misty, Octavia, Ronald, Cornell] [Hofer/Cooks] set for U.S. Senate
run
Joining a crowded field for the open U.S. Senate seat is [Republi-
can/Democrat] [Misty, Octavia, Ronald, Cornell] [Hofer/Cooks]. [Hofer/Cooks],
a [single/married] 47-year-old [businessman/businesswoman] [with no
children/exclude], was out speaking with voters on Friday, [joined
by [his/her]/exclude] [wife/husband/exclude] [and/exclude] [two young
sons,/exclude] about the stakes of this election.
“I’ll work across party lines, not to pick sides, but to find common ground,”
[Hofer/Cooks] said.
[Hofer/Cooks] introduced [himself/herself] to voters as an [entrepreneur and
proud American/ entrepreneur, proud American, [and single mother/and sin-
gle father/mother, and wife/father, and husband/and wife/and husband]] who
can’t wait for change to come in Washington D.C.
“When I see something is wrong, when I see someone struggling, I think about
what am I going to be able to do today to make a difference,” [Hofer/Cooks]
said. “That’s why I’m running for the U.S. Senate.”
Note: In these news stories, the language in brackets [] is the text that varied based on which
treatment group the respondent was randomized into or based on the respondent’s political
party. The randomization process was separate for each news article, so during this survey,
each respondent was randomized into three separate treatment groups.
After reading each news story, respondents answered several questions evaluating the
candidate. I expect there are four broad potential explanations for how parenthood influences
voters’ candidate evaluations. First, I expect parenthood impacts voters’ assessment of a
candidate’s overall ability to serve. This relates to their overall competence to serve in
government, as well as their collective time, ability, and energy to get the job done, should
they be elected. Secondly, parenthood likely sends a signal to voters about how relatable
the candidate is, if the candidate is likely to share their values and if the candidate will
represent them and their policy needs. Thirdly, those with children may be stereotyped as
possessing different character traits than those without children. For example, a mother,
simply because of her gender and parental status, may be stereotyped as more warm or
more compassionate. Finally, voters may use a candidate’s parental status to infer their
ideological leanings. For example, maybe because it is more traditional for a politician to be
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married and have children, voters will perceive these candidates as more conservative than
a single candidate without children.
To gauge overall electoral support, I asked “On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates that
you would never support this candidate, and 7 indicates that you would always support this
candidate, where would you place this candidate?”10 Several of my theoretical expectations
center around the view that respondents will perceive women with young children as less
committed to their careers. To operationalize this concept, I ask several questions. First,
respondents answer, from strongly disagree to strongly agree, the question, “This candidate
has the time and energy to devote to public service.” Additionally, I include two measures
of competence, as I expect women with children, as compared to without children, may
be stereotyped as less competent. Respondents rated each candidate on a 7-point scale
how capable and how skillful they perceive the candidate to be.11 I expect women with
young children to be viewed as more warm and feminine and include several questions to
measure each concept. To measure warmth, respondents rated on a 7-point scale how sincere
and selfish (reverse-coded) the candidate is. To examine both stereotypical feminine and
masculine traits, I include four questions that ask respondents to rate the candidate on two
feminine traits – compassionate and emotional – and two masculine traits – decisive and
tough.12
One reason voters may favor candidates who are married and have children is that these
candidates are viewed as overall more relatable. To measure this, I ask respondents on a
7-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree two questions – “This candidate shares
similar values to my own,” and “This candidate represents people like me.” Furthermore,
I expect candidates with families may be preferred because they are perceived as having a
better understanding of the issues and policies that most impact families and will be more
likely to prioritize these issues should they be elected. To measure this explanation, I include
10Question wording is based on (Hainmueller, Hopkins & Yamamoto 2014).
11Question wording is based on (Deason 2020, Cuddy, Fiske & Glick 2004).
12Question wording is based on (Dolan & Lynch 2014, Huddy & Terkildsen 1993).
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the question, “This candidate will prioritize issues important to families.” Additionally, I am
also curious if parenthood has any implications for the perceived ideology of a candidate, so
I include the question, “How would you rate this candidate?” and had respondents rate the
candidate from very liberal to very conservative.13
For my survey sample, I use Lucid, an online survey company that uses attention checks
and open-ended questions to screen out low quality participants while also providing a sample
that well reflects national demographics across age, gender, race, income, and political party
(Coppock & McClellan 2019, Fang & Huber 2020). See the appendix for a full breakdown
of the demographics of my survey sample, but I find this sample has a good balance of
ideologies and political parties, with 36% of my sample identifying as Republicans, 38% as
Democrats, and 26% as Independents. The sample is 70% White and evenly split on gender.
I requested 3,000 respondents, each of which evaluated three news stories for a total sample
of 9,000.14
My analysis is a combination of t-tests and OLS regression models. While most of my
dependent variables are ordinal, linear regression has been recommended when estimating the
causal effects of experimental treatments, even when the dependent variable is not continuous
(Gomila 2020).15 Each respondent has three separate observations within my data; therefore,
I cluster standard errors by respondent in all models. Additionally, while I crafted the three
news stories to be as similar as possible, it is likely there is some variation in how respondents
evaluate each candidate based on the specific language in each vignette. Therefore, to
accommodate for these variations, in most models I include a factored variable for which
vignette was being evaluated.16
13Question wording is based on (Jones & Brewer 2019).
14The 3,000 represents the surveys that were completed 100%. Other respondents did not answer all
questions, but were included in the analysis when they responded to all variables included in the given
model. Therefore, in most models, the sample size is larger than 9,000.
15As a robustness check, in the appendix I include all models as ordered logit models. Results are nearly
identical and any differences are noted in the appendix.
16I also ran all models subset out by vignette and nearly all results were consistently significant across the
three vignettes, and for the few occasions when a treatment variable was not significant in one vignette, the
coefficient was always in the same direction as the other vignettes. Therefore, I concluded it was appropriate
to present in the body of the text the models the incorporate all vignettes.
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2.5 Results
To provide a complete view of the broader findings before jumping into more nuanced
results, Table 2.1 displays the regression results for all dependent variables. It appears that
across most dependent variables, parenthood shapes how voters evaluated candidates. The
first model in Table 2.1 estimates respondents’ overall willingness to support a candidate.
Across all treatment groups, gender, race, and marital status do not significantly predict level
of support, but I do find that respondents are significantly more likely to support candidates
with young children as compared to candidates with no children. This finding is consistent
with past research, which also finds voters prefer candidates who are parents (Campbell &
Cowley 2018, Teele, Kalla & Rosenbluth 2018).
In support of hypothesis 2, the second model in Table 2.1 shows those with no children
are rated as significantly more likely to have the time and energy to serve as compared
to those with young children. When holding other treatment variables constant and only
varying if the candidate has children or not, I find the treatment group with young children
is always rated as having significantly less time and energy.
Parenthood also seems to impact how respondents ascribe certain character traits to
candidates. Overall, I find support for hypothesis 3, such that mothers are viewed as more
warm and more feminine. For my two measures of warmth – sincere and selfish (reverse-
coded) – I find parents are perceived as more warm than non-parents. Women and parents
are viewed as significantly more sincere, and parents are rated as less selfish than non-
parents. For feminine traits, compassionate and emotional, I find parents, in particular
mothers, are perceived as possessing more feminine traits. Women and parents are rated as
significantly more compassionate, and parents are perceived as significantly more emotional.
For masculine traits, I find no significant findings for my dependent variable of perceived





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Across my two measures of relatability, respondents were also significantly more likely
to say candidates with children share more similar values to their own, and that parents
better represent people like themselves. This finding was also true for women and married
candidates, who were evaluated as significantly better at representing people like me. As
expected, parents were characterized as more likely to prioritize issues important to families,
as were women candidates.
Finally, candidates without children were overall perceived as more conservative than
parents. Additionally, women and single candidates were rated as more liberal-leaning.
Collectively, I find that parental status shapes much of how different types of candidates are
evaluated, such that parents, as compared to non-parents, receive increased support, rated as
having less time and energy to serve, are perceived as more warm, feminine, and masculine,
more relatable, better on family issues, and more liberal.
2.5.1 Support Results
Diving into more nuanced results, I turn first to overall willingness to support different
types of candidates. Figure 2.1 shows the estimate and confidence interval for level of support
for each of the 16 treatment groups, showcasing that respondents were most likely to support
White, married mothers and expressed the lowest level of support for White and Black men
who are single and do not have children.
Ultimately, I do not find support for hypothesis 1, that support will be greater for men
with young children than women with young children. For example, when I compare all
treatments groups with children by gender, the average level of support for women is 5.05
and for men is 5.04. When I examine differences by race or marital status, I also do not find
any support for hypothesis 1. In fact, across all treatment groups, it appears this preference
for candidates who are parents is stronger for men candidates. In Figure 2.2, I plot the results
of basic t-tests for comparing candidates with and without children for all candidates and
then broken down by women and men candidates. It appears respondents are significantly
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more likely to support a father compared to a man without children, but that support for
women candidates is not significantly different between mothers and non-mothers.
While I encourage future research on why men benefit most from becoming parents in
the eyes of voters, a possible explanation for this finding is that the traits often ascribed
to parenthood, such as sincerity or compassionate are already traits which are often stereo-
typically associated with women. Therefore, while women who have children gain no extra
bonus from becoming a parent, men who have children retain the positive stereotypes of
being a man while gaining the positive stereotypes of parenthood.
I do not find any support for hypothesis 4, that Republicans would be less supportive
than Democrats of women with young children. Republican and Democratic respondents
evaluated women with young children, regardless of her marital status or race, nearly iden-
tically in terms of willingness to support a given candidate. Furthermore, in the appendix, I
separate out respondents by party and gender and run the same regression models, and find
it is Democrats and women driving this stronger preference for candidates with children.
The coefficient for both Democrats and Republicans is negative, meaning more support for
candidates with children; however, it is only statistically significant for Democrats. Similarly,
the coefficient for men respondents is substantively small and not statistically significant,
while women respondents show a much stronger preference for parents.
In Table 2.1, I find that across all groups, marital status does not predict level of support.
However, I find some conditional support for hypothesis 5, that respondents favor married
parents to single parents. In a t-test comparison, respondents demonstrated significantly
higher support for White mothers who are married (5.15) as compared to single (4.93).
However, I do not find a significant difference by marital status for parents who are White
men or Black candidates. Furthermore, I find a lack of significant differences in level of
support for White and Black candidates. White women with children have higher levels of
support (5.15) than Black women with children (5.06), but the difference is not statistically
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Figure 2.1: Support for Candidates by Treatment Group
Note: This figure presents the estimate and 95% confidence interval for the level of support for each
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Figure 2.2: Support for Candidates by Parental Status
Note: This figure presents the estimate and 95% confidence interval for the level of support for
candidates who have young children and those who do not.
27
and Black women with young children. To summarize, I find respondents favor candidates
who are parents, and that this preference is greater for men candidates. Respondents who
demonstrate greater support for candidates with children are women and Democrats. I find
that, at times, marital status conditions perception of parenthood, but do not find much
support for race affecting levels of support for parents.
To better understand why I did not have support for my hypotheses surrounding candi-
date’s race, I examine if respondents were able to correctly identify the race of the candidate
they read about. Past research has made strong arguments for the use of racially-distinctive
name to cue race in survey experiments (e.g. Butler & Homola 2017). However, my lack of
findings based on a candidate’s race may be due to participants not correctly identifying the
race of the treatment group they were assigned. To avoid biasing respondents’ evaluations
for each vignette, a manipulation check question was only included after the third vignette,
and respondents were asked what was the race of the candidate in the article they just read.
Only 27% of respondents correctly answered this question, which is a low enough rate that
puts into question if respondents correctly received the treatment as intended.
Furthermore, when I restrict the sample to only responses to the third vignette and those
who correctly identified the race of the candidate they evaluated, I find race did appear to
condition responses. The sample size is small and the group who correctly identified the
candidate’s race is likely not a random sample from the sample as a whole, so I hedge
drawing any strong conclusions from this subset of findings. However, I find that for this
subset of respondents, they were most likely to support White candidates who were parents
and least likely to support Black candidates who were not parents. Furthermore, Black
parents were rated as having significantly less time and energy than White parents. For
example, when comparing single mothers, White mothers were rated as having significantly
more time and energy (4.6) than Black mothers (3.9), as well as were perceived as having
significantly more shared values with respondents, 4.8 and 4.2 respectively. For married
mothers, respondents showed significantly more support for White mothers (5.5) than Black
28
mothers (4.9), and rated White married mothers as more compassionate, emotional, and
decisive. I strongly encourage future research that incorporates stronger racial cues, such as
a photo or specifically mentioning the race of the candidate, to ensure respondents correctly
perceive the treatment group they are assigned.
2.5.2 Time & Energy Results
Overall, parents of young children receive higher levels of electoral support, but parents
do face a key disadvantage in regards to their perceived time and energy. Figure 2.3 plots
results comparing candidates with and without children for the question, “This candidate has
the time & energy to devote to public service.” In Figure 2.3, I plot across all candidates, then
by marital status, and then two ideal types to demonstrate some interesting intersectional
results. The top two lines demonstrate that respondents perceived candidates with young
children as having significantly less time and energy to serve as compared to candidates
without children. When I separate out by candidate’s marital status, I find that parents,
regardless of marital status, are perceived as having less time and energy; however, the
penalty is greatest single parents. Single candidates without children are perceived to have
the most time and energy, 4.6, while single parents are perceived to have the least time and
energy, 4.2.17
When I examine perceived time and energy by specific treatment groups, I find the
gap between parents and non-parents was greatest for Black, single women, such that the
average perceived time and energy for Black single mothers was 4.0 and without children
was 4.6. Holding all other variable constant, when comparing a candidate with and without
children, the one without children was consistently ranked as having more time and energy.
However, the one key group immune from this parental penalty is White, married, men, as
demonstrated in Figure 2.3. While White, married men without children were estimated as
17In the appendix, I plot all treatment groups by perceive time and energy to serve, and the four bottom
ranked candidates were single parents, signifying marital status conditions perceptions of parenthood and
one’s time and energy to serve.
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having more time and energy than White, married fathers, the difference is not statistically
significant. While I encourage future research to examine why White, married men are
exempt from this parental penalty, it could be due to a perception that his wife is providing
the majority of child care, and therefore, having children takes up less of his time and energy
than other types of candidates. Straight, married men can pursue elected office while relying
on their wives to fulfill household child care needs, a luxury women candidates often do not
have.
Looking at other specific treatments groups, it does appear gender conditions perceptions
of parenthood. For example, White, single mothers are perceived as having significantly less
time and energy (4.1) than White, single fathers (4.28). I find some support for hypothesis
6, such that single women with children are perceived as having less energy than married
women. For White women, there is no significant difference in time and energy by relation-
ship status; however, for Black mothers, those who are single are rated as having significantly
less time and energy (4.05) than those who are married (4.28).18
To offer more context to respondents’ perceptions of different types of candidates, I in-
cluded an open-ended question asking, “Overall, what was your impression of this candidate?
Why do you think this candidate would, or would not, make a good candidate?” Respon-
dents’ answers to this question highlight that mothers, particularly single mothers, were
often questioned for their decision to run and their ability to balance home responsibilities
with their political aspirations. These sample comments highlight these concerns.
18As an extension of perceived time and energy to serve, respondents also rated each candidate’s perceived
competence, measured by how capable and skillful they thought each candidate to be. Across all treatment
groups, I found gender, race, relationship status, and children did not impact how competent a candidate is
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Figure 2.3: Candidates’ Time & Energy to Serve
Note: This figure presents the estimate and 95% confidence interval for the question “This candidate
has the time and energy to devote to public service.” Responses range from 0, strongly disagree, to
6, strongly agree.
“Two young children. Should not run. Raise your children, don’t go to DC.”
(Black, single mother treatment group)
“Don’t think she will have the time needed to devote to her job. Her small
children will suffer.” (White, single mother treatment group)
“Would make a good candidate since she has time for running campaign.
Not like other women, they are busy with families and kids. She is not.” (Black,
married, woman, no children treatment group)
“I don’t think it’s appropriate to bring children out on the campaign trail.”
(White, single mother treatment group)
However, it is clear looking at the responses to the open-ended question that respondents
had contradictory reactions to parenthood in politics. While some viewed parenthood as
taking away a candidate’s time and energy from serving in Congress, others viewed parent-
hood as a positive feature that aided the candidate’s appeal, and that those without children
are less able to understand the issues most important to families. Here are some examples
of expressed positivity about parents in politics.
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“Sounds like a great candidate. The fact that she is a single mother I think shows
that she understands responsibility and hardships many people face.” (Black,
single mother treatment group)
“While she has plenty of career experience behind her she has no experi-
ence as to what it is like to raise children and take care of a family.” (White,
married woman with no children treatment group)
“He is young and has ideas to try to help families...He has a young fam-
ily but with a supportive wife he should be able to get things done.” (Black,
married father treatment group)
“I think this candidate would make a good candidate based on him being a
caring father.” (Black, single father treatment group)
“I think it would be great to have a fellow mom in office, fighting for fam-
ily issues.” (White, single mother treatment group)
2.5.3 Other Dependent Variable Results
Overall, I find parents, particularly mothers, are evaluated as more warm and more
likely to possess feminine traits. In Figure 2.4 I plot perceive sincerity and compassion for
candidates with and without children by the candidate’s gender. For both traits, women
with children are rated highest and men without children are rated lowest. It is clear from
Figure 2.4 that gender and parenthood condition perceived warmth and feminine traits, such
that even though women are thought to stereotypically be more warm and feminine, men
with children are rated more highly on these traits than women without children. In the
appendix, I plot rated compassion for all treatment groups, and the top four rated groups
are mothers and those rated least compassionate are single men without children.
Past research suggests that being evaluated as more warm or more feminine may be a
disadvantage in seeking political office, as these traits are often thought of as incongruent
with the traits necessary for political leadership (Deason, Greenlee & Langner 2015, Huddy
& Terkildsen 1993). However, I do not find that the candidates rated as more warm and
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Figure 2.4: Candidates’ Warmth & Feminine Traits
Note: This figure presents the estimate and 95% confidence interval for the questions “How sin-
cere/compassionate is this candidate?” Responses are on a 5-point scale from not at all to extremely.
it may only be when these traits are emphasized that they negatively impact mothers running
for office. Warmth and femininity are incongruent with the traits thought to be most desired
for political leadership; however, it appears the positives of being a parent, such as more
relatable, seem to be overweighed in respondents’ minds in making decisions about overall
electoral support.
In explaining why voters tend to favor parents for political office, I find that relatability
is a key factor, such that respondents rate parents as sharing more values with them and as
more likely to represent people like them. Across all treatment groups, single men without
children were consistently rated as the least relatable. When I break down these results by
respondents’ gender, as presented in Figure 2.5, I find this perception was predominately
driven by women, who were significantly more likely to say they share more values with
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candidates who have children and are married. The coefficients for men respondents are in
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 ''This candidate shares similar values to my own.''
● ●Children No Children
Figure 2.5: Candidate Shares Values with Me
Note: This figure presents the estimate and 95% confidence interval for the question “This candidate
shares similar values to my own.” Responses range from 0, strongly disagree, to 6, strongly agree.
The y-axis presents all respondents, as well as results subset out by respondents’ gender.
Similarly, I asked respondents if they felt the candidate represented people like them, and
respondents were significantly more likely to rate women, married, and parent candidates
as “represents people like me.” Respondents consistently rated married mothers as the most
relatable and men with no children as the least relatable. In Figure 2.6, I present this
dependent variable on subsets of respondents by gender and political party, comparing how
different groups rated single men without children to married mothers. Democrats and
women seem to be driving much of this effect for married mothers. For example, when
subset by respondents’ gender, men did not significantly rate any of the treatment groups
as better representing people like me, but women rated significantly higher candidates who
were women, married, and parents. There is no significant difference in how Republicans
rated single men without children and married mothers, but Democrats were significantly
more likely to say they feel married mothers represent them better.
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 ''This candidate represents people like me.''
● ●Men/Single/No Children Women/Married/Children
Figure 2.6: Candidate Represents Me
Note: This figure presents the estimate and 95% confidence interval for the question “This candidate
represents people like me.” Responses range from 0, strongly disagree, to 6, strongly agree. The y-axis
presents all respondents, as well as results subset out by respondents’ gender or political party.
of candidates because they perceive that individual understands them, their needs, and will
prioritize issues and policies most important to their lives. Figure 2.7 demonstrates that
both parental status and gender condition perceptions of issue ownership and competence
on family issues. Candidates perceived as best able to handle family issues are women with
children and those perceived as least capable at handling family issues are men without
children.
Finally, I asked respondents to place candidates on an ideological scale. Because re-
spondents received a candidate that matches their own party, it is most useful to present
these findings by party. Figure 2.8 showcases the regression results for perceived ideology
by party. For Republican respondents, they rated men and married candidates as signifi-
cantly more conservative, whereas Democrats perceived parents as more liberal than non-
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Figure 2.7: Candidate & Family Issues
Note: This figure presents the estimate and 95% confidence interval for the question “This candidate
will prioritize issues important to families” Responses range from 0, strongly disagree, to 6, strongly
agree.
mothers and the most conservative was Black, married men without children. This runs
counter to past research which finds that Black candidates are often perceived as more lib-
eral (McDermott 1998), so this highlights that candidates’ multiple identities interact in
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Figure 2.8: Candidate & Ideology
Note: This figure presents the OLS regression results with confidence intervals by respondents’ political
party for the question “How would you rate this candidate?” Responses range from 0, very liberal, to
6, very conservative.
2.6 Discussion
In this study, respondents indicated they perceive parents of young children have less
time and energy to devote to public service, but I ultimately find parents of young children
are overall more likely to receive electoral support than candidates without children. Re-
spondents consistently rated parents as more relatable, better on family issues, more warm,
superior on both traditionally feminine and masculine traits, and overall more liberal. This
suggests that while mothers of young children may not be overall disadvantaged in seeking
political office, they may have to prove to voters that their family responsibilities will not
detract from being a committed and successful politician. Therefore, while mothers in the
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past have often been less likely to highlight their family in their campaign, it may actually be
advantageous for women politicians to more heavily showcase their family and their role as a
mother on the campaign trail. However, consistent with arguments made by Teele, Kalla &
Rosenbluth (2018), this voter preference for candidates who are parents does present unique
challenges for women candidates. On average, women do perform more household chores
and child care than men, leaving mothers of young children less time and energy to devote
to their political aspirations than fathers.19
Another unexpected outcome of this experiment was that I found that often gender and
marital status condition the effect of parenthood on voters’ perceptions, but I surprisingly
found limited examples of parenthood effects conditional on race. I theorized that because
Black mothers are more negatively stereotyped than White mothers, this would present
additional hurdles for Black mothers running for political office. However, it is possible that
stereotypes of Black mothers, as a whole, do not apply to Black mothers who are politicians.
Schneider & Bos (2014) find that often character traits traditionally ascribed to women are
often not equally applied to women politicians. For example, they find women politicians are
not stereotyped as warm or empathetic in the same way women as a whole are. Therefore,
it is possible the stereotypes of Black mothers may not be equally ascribed to Black mothers
who run for political office. I encourage future research on how stereotypes of Black women
are applied to Black women politicians. Additionally, due to sample size limitations, this
paper only examines differences between White and Black mothers. I expect Latina and
Asian-American mothers may face unique stereotypes from voters and encourage future
research that examines how motherhood intersects with other racial and ethnic identities.
Furthermore, in this study, I made the decision to frame each candidate as seeking a
seat in the U.S. Senate. I made this decision as I expected that serving in Congress, which
requires long work hours and spending time in Washington D.C., to be when parents with
19While I frame this parental penalty of having less time and energy for politics as a disadvantage for
parents running for office, I acknowledge this may not be considered a disadvantage among all voters. In
particular, for voters who prefer a smaller government, having less time and energy to serve may not be
viewed negatively.
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young children face the most skepticism from voters. However, I find that even at this high-
level of political leadership, voters still prefer parents to non-parents. Therefore, I encourage
future research on if this preference of parents as candidates is exacerbated in lower offices,
particularly at the local level, where the time and energy requirements are lower and the
desired character traits are different.
Finally, I had expected there to be greater differences by respondents’ political party but
overall do not find Democrats and Republicans rate mothers of young children differently.
This lack of a party dynamic could be due to the design, which only assigned respondents
to a co-partisan candidate. Overall, I would expect Republican mothers are perceived very
differently than Democratic mothers, and therefore, encourage future research on how party
intersects with motherhood. Additionally, a limitation to this paper is that in the treatment
design, the language was kept consistent across all conditions to isolate the effects of my
main interests – parenthood, gender, race, and marital status. However, in reality, I would
not expect that Republicans and Democrats would use the same language or choose to frame
themselves in the same way. The same is likely also true for White and Black candidates
or women and men candidates. This limitation of an experimental design encourages more
research on how Republican and Democratic mothers running for office speak about their
identity as a mother and how this framing is likely partisan.
Overall, I find that respondents favor candidates who are parents, but the open-ended
responses highlight that, at times, voters can have opposite reactions to parenthood. Some
view parenthood as a positive for candidates while others view it as a negative. The impacts
of parenthood on a candidate’s success if likely conditional on the specific region and cultural
norms of the area where a candidate running, and candidates may have to adjust how their




Table 2.2: Names used in Experiment
Vignette 1 Vignette 2 Vignette 3
Black man Antoine Cedric Cornell
Black woman Ayanna Janelle Octavia
Black last name Smalls Washington Cooks
White man Travis Charles Ronald
White woman Lillie Sharon Misty
White last name Novak Steffen Hofer
I use the politician’s name in the treatments to cue both gender and race. In the exper-
iment, the respondents are randomized into a treatment group of either a Black man, Black
woman, White man, or White woman. The last names were selected using data from the
2000 Census (Census 2014). I restricted the Census to only last names that occur at least
5,000 times. For the last names selected, 90%+ of Census respondents were either White
or Black, respectively. To select the first names, I used data that had respondents rate first
names on race, as well as other traits and characteristics (Hayes & Mitchell N.D.). I first
restricted the names to the first names most likely be identified as either a White or African
American name. Then, from those names, I matched names across important characteristics,
including perceived middle class, competence, and warmth.
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2.7.2 Survey Question Wording
• Children: Are you the parent or guardian of any children? Yes, I have children under
18; Yes, all my children are 18 years old or older; No, I do not have children.
• Marital: Are you currently... Single; Partnered, not living together; Partnered, living
together; Married; Divorced; Widowed; Other (fill in blank)
• Gender: What is your gender? Man, Woman, Other (fill in blank)
• Race: Which racial or ethnic groups describe you? Mark all that apply. White; Black
or African American; Hispanic or Latino(a); Asian American; Native American or
American Indian; Other
• Ideology: In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint? Very
liberal, liberal, moderate, conservative, very conservative, not sure.
• Party: In general, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an indepen-
dent, or something else? Republican; Democrat; Independent or other party
• Independents (only displayed for those who selected “independent or other party” in
the previous question): If you had to choose, do you think of yourself as more similar
to Republicans or Democrats? More similar to Republicans than Democrats; More
similar to Democrats than Republicans.
• Income: What is the annual household income for all members of your family? This
figure should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income.
Less than $10,000; $10,000 - $19,999; $20,000 - $29,999; $30,000 - $39,999; $40,000-
$49,999; $50,000 - $59,999; $60,000 - $69,999; $70,000 - $79,999; $80,000 - $89,999;
$90,000 - $99,999; $100,000 - $149,999; More than $150,000
• Education: What is the highest level of education you have completed? Less than high
school diploma; High school graduate or GED; Some college; 2-year degree; 4-year
degree; Post-graduate education
• Religion: How often do you attend religious services, apart from occasional weddings,
baptisms or funerals? Every week; Almost every week; Once or twice a month; A few
times a year; Never
• Racial resentment 1: It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if
blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. 4-point scale
from strongly disagree to strongly agree.20
• Racial resentment 2: Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
4-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. This measure is reverse-coded.
• Sexism 1: Most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women.
4-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree.21
• Sexism 2: A husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to look after home and
family. 4-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree.
• Sexism 3: Women can handle job pressures as well as men. 4-point scale from strongly
disagree to strongly agree. This measure is reverse-coded.
20Racial resentment question wordings based on (Kinder, Sanders & Sanders 1996, Valentino, Hutchings
& White 2002).
21Sexism question wordings based on (Alexander & Andersen 1993, Bracic, Israel-Trummel, Rhinehart &
Shortle 2020, Sanbonmatsu 2003).
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• Working mothers 1: A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.
4-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree.22
• Working mothers 2: A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a rela-
tionship with her children as a mother who does not work. 4-point scale from strongly
agree to strongly disagree. This measure is reverse-coded.
• Support: On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates that you would never support this
candidate, and 7 indicates that you would always support this candidate, where would
you place this candidate?23
• Values: This candidate shares similar values to my own. 7-point scale from strongly
disagree to strongly agree.
• Time: This candidate has the time and energy to devote to public service. 7-point
scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree.
• Represent: This candidate represents people like me. 7-point scale from strongly dis-
agree to strongly agree.
• Priorities: This candidate will prioritize issues important to families. 7-point scale
from strongly disagree to strongly agree.
• Candidate Ideology: How would you rate this candidate? Very liberal, liberal, some-
what liberal, middle of the road, somewhat conservative, conservative, very conserva-
tive.24
• Warmth measures: How sincere is this candidate? How selfish is this candidate? 5-
point scale from not at all to extremely. The selfish measure is reverse-coded.25
• Competence measures: How capable is this candidate? How skillful is this candidate?
5-point scale from not at all to extremely.
• Feminine trait: How compassionate is this candidate? How emotional is this candidate?
5-point scale from not at all to extremely.26
• Masculine trait: How decisive is this candidate? How tough is this candidate? 5-point
scale from not at all to extremely.
• Open ended question: Overall, what was your impression of this candidate? Why do
you think this candidate would, or would not, make a good candidate?
22Working mothers question wordings based on (Menaghan & Parcel 1991).
23Question wording is based on (Hainmueller, Hopkins & Yamamoto 2014).
24Question wording is based on (Jones & Brewer 2019).
25Warmth and competence question wordings based on (Deason 2020, Cuddy, Fiske & Glick 2004).
26Trait question wordings based on (Dolan & Lynch 2014, Huddy & Terkildsen 1993).
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2.7.3 Survey Sample
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3.9 4.1 4.3 4.5 4.7
Candidate Has The Time & Energy To 
Devote To Public Service
 (Estimate with 95% CI)
Figure 2.9: Candidates’ Energy to Serve by Treatment Group
Note: This figure presents the estimate and 95% confidence interval for each treatment group for the
question “This candidate has the time and energy to devote to public service.” Responses range from
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Figure 2.10: How Sincere a Candidate is by Treatment Group
Note: This figure presents the estimate and 95% confidence interval for each treatment group for the
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Figure 2.11: How Selfish a Candidate is by Treatment Group
Note: This figure presents the estimate and 95% confidence interval for each treatment group for the
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Figure 2.12: How Capable a Candidate is by Treatment Group
Note: This figure presents the estimate and 95% confidence interval for each treatment group for the
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Figure 2.13: How Skillful a Candidate is by Treatment Group
Note: This figure presents the estimate and 95% confidence interval for each treatment group for the
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Figure 2.14: How Compassionate a Candidate is by Treatment Group
Note: This figure presents the estimate and 95% confidence interval for each treatment group for the
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Figure 2.15: How Emotional a Candidate is by Treatment Group
Note: This figure presents the estimate and 95% confidence interval for each treatment group for the

















Man, White, Married, No Children
Woman, Black, Single, Children
Man, Black, Married, Children
Man, Black, Single, No Children
Man, White, Single, No Children
Woman, White, Married, No Children
Man, White, Married, Children
Woman, Black, Single, No Children
Man, Black, Single, Children
Woman, White, Single, No Children
Man, Black, Married, No Children
Woman, Black, Married, No Children
Man, White, Single, Children
Woman, White, Single, Children
Woman, Black, Married, Children
Woman, White, Married, Children
2.2 2.3 2.4
How Decisive the Candidate is
 (Estimate with 95% CI)
Figure 2.16: How Decisive a Candidate is by Treatment Group
Note: This figure presents the estimate and 95% confidence interval for each treatment group for the
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Figure 2.17: How Tough a Candidate is by Treatment Group
Note: This figure presents the estimate and 95% confidence interval for each treatment group for the
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Figure 2.18: Candidate Shares Values with Me by Treatment Group
Note: This figure presents the estimate and 95% confidence interval for each treatment group for the
question “This candidate shares similar values to my own.” Responses range from 0, strongly disagree,
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Candidate Represents People Like Me
 (Estimate with 95% CI)
Figure 2.19: Candidate Represents Me by Treatment Group
Note: This figure presents the estimate and 95% confidence interval for each treatment group for the
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4.0 4.2 4.4 4.6
Candidate Will Prioritize Issues 
 Important to Families
 (Estimate with 95% CI)
Figure 2.20: Candidate & Family Issues by Treatment Group
Note: This figure presents the estimate and 95% confidence interval for each treatment group for the
question “This candidate will prioritize issues important to families” Responses range from 0, strongly
disagree, to 6, strongly agree.
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2.7.5 Additional Dependent Variables Models
Table 2.4: Models: Competence Depen-
dent Variables
Competence







No children −0.01 −0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Vignette 2 0.06∗ 0.07∗
(0.02) (0.02)




Adj. R2 0.00 0.00
Num. obs. 9366 9372
∗p < 0.05. These are OLS regres-
sion models for two measures of candi-
date competence – capable and skillful.
These were not included in the body of
the text because I did not find that gender,
race, marital status, or parental status in-
fluenced perceptions of candidate compe-
tence.
2.7.6 Models with Additional Respondent Covariates
The three tables below are all dependent variables included in the body of the paper,
but these models include additional respondent covariates. The inclusion of these additional
independent variables does not significantly change many of the findings presented in the
body of this paper.
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Table 2.5: Models with Additional Covariates
Support Time Sincere Selfish
Woman candidate 0.05 −0.03 0.06∗ −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Black candidate −0.03 −0.00 −0.01 −0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Single candidate −0.06∗ −0.03 0.00 −0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
No children candidate −0.12∗ 0.29∗ −0.14∗ 0.06∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Vignette 2 0.04∗ 0.03 −0.06∗ 0.05∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Vignette 3 −0.01 0.01 −0.09∗ 0.11∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Women −0.00 −0.12∗ 0.02 −0.07∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Black −0.18∗ −0.13 −0.11∗ 0.09
(0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Latinx −0.03 0.01 −0.03 0.04
(0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)
Mixed race −0.01 0.10 0.04 −0.07
(0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)
Other race −0.21∗ −0.15 −0.12 0.06
(0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)
Age 0.01∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗ −0.02∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ideology −0.07∗ −0.13∗ −0.03∗ −0.06∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Independent −0.44∗ −0.34∗ −0.27∗ 0.05
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Republican 0.08 0.15∗ 0.08 −0.05
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Income 0.03∗ 0.01 0.02∗ 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education 0.08∗ 0.05∗ 0.04∗ 0.05∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Religion 0.09∗ 0.10∗ 0.06∗ 0.07∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced −0.07 −0.11 −0.06 0.01
(0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Other −0.42 −0.82∗ −0.25 0.31
(0.23) (0.22) (0.18) (0.19)
Partnered 0.07 0.07 0.03 −0.16∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Single −0.01 −0.04 −0.04 −0.13∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Widowed −0.27∗ −0.16 −0.17∗ −0.00
(0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Older children −0.10 −0.02 −0.12∗ −0.05
(0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Young children 0.34∗ 0.30∗ 0.18∗ 0.02
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Sexism 0.04∗ 0.02 0.02∗ 0.10∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Racism −0.02 −0.01 −0.02 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Working mothers −0.05∗ −0.06∗ −0.04∗ 0.08∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Intercept 4.12∗ 3.90∗ 1.99∗ 1.28∗
(0.15) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12)
Adj. R2 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.19
Num. obs. 8780 8780 8765 8769
∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.6: Models with Additional Covariates
Compassionate Emotional Decisive Tough
Woman candidate 0.09∗ 0.03 0.04 0.06∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Black candidate −0.02 −0.04 −0.03 −0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Single candidate −0.03 −0.02 −0.02 −0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
No children candidate −0.18∗ −0.18∗ −0.04 −0.05∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Vignette 2 −0.05∗ 0.01 −0.02 −0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Vignette 3 −0.09∗ −0.02 −0.04∗ 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Women 0.04 −0.09∗ −0.00 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Black −0.09 −0.01 −0.19∗ −0.04
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Latinx −0.03 0.08 −0.05 −0.04
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Mixed race 0.08 0.02 0.05 −0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Other race −0.13∗ −0.06 −0.05 −0.11
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Age 0.01∗ −0.00∗ 0.01∗ 0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ideology −0.03∗ −0.03 −0.04∗ −0.04∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Independent −0.20∗ −0.16∗ −0.18∗ −0.15∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Republican 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.09∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Income 0.01∗ 0.02∗ 0.02∗ 0.02∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education 0.04∗ 0.03∗ 0.05∗ 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Religion 0.06∗ 0.09∗ 0.05∗ 0.07∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced −0.06 −0.03 0.07 −0.00
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Other −0.21 0.09 0.02 0.05
(0.18) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17)
Partnered 0.09 −0.02 0.01 0.04
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Single −0.01 −0.03 0.01 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Widowed −0.11 −0.11 −0.13 −0.16∗
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Older children −0.12∗ −0.04 −0.10∗ −0.08
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Young children 0.18∗ 0.15∗ 0.12∗ 0.17∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Sexism 0.02∗ 0.06∗ 0.00 0.03∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Racism −0.02∗ −0.01 −0.02 −0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Working mothers −0.04∗ 0.01 −0.01 −0.04∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Intercept 2.04∗ 1.93∗ 1.92∗ 1.81∗
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Adj. R2 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.06
Num. obs. 8764 8762 8762 8770
∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.7: Models with Additional Covariates
Values Rep Me Fam Issues Ideology
Woman candidate 0.02 0.08∗ 0.08∗ −0.09∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Black candidate 0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Single candidate −0.05∗ −0.10∗ −0.06∗ −0.08∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
No children candidate −0.14∗ −0.09∗ −0.35∗ 0.10∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Vignette 2 −0.03 −0.01 −0.05∗ −0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Vignette 3 −0.15∗ −0.09∗ −0.31∗ −0.05∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Women −0.08∗ −0.10∗ −0.01 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Black −0.16∗ −0.16∗ −0.14∗ −0.08
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Latinx −0.11 −0.11 −0.17 −0.10
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
Mixed race 0.03 −0.04 0.02 −0.03
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Other race −0.30∗ −0.19∗ −0.19∗ −0.11
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Age 0.01∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ideology −0.12∗ −0.13∗ −0.10∗ 0.78∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Independent −0.42∗ −0.42∗ −0.39∗ 0.18∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Republican 0.11∗ 0.11∗ 0.11∗ 0.16∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Income 0.01 0.01 0.02∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education 0.06∗ 0.03∗ 0.03 −0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Religion 0.11∗ 0.13∗ 0.09∗ −0.05∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced −0.07 −0.06 −0.08 0.15∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Other −0.63∗ −0.77∗ −0.69∗ 0.47
(0.23) (0.19) (0.23) (0.27)
Partnered 0.13∗ 0.10 0.08 0.14∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Single 0.03 −0.00 0.01 0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Widowed −0.13 −0.20∗ −0.20∗ −0.06
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Older children −0.03 −0.02 −0.07 −0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Young children 0.32∗ 0.32∗ 0.25∗ −0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Sexism 0.04∗ 0.05∗ 0.03∗ −0.03∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Racism −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Working mothers −0.04∗ −0.04∗ −0.05∗ −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Intercept 3.81∗ 3.86∗ 4.19∗ 1.15∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
Adj. R2 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.34
Num. obs. 8779 8777 8736 8761
∗p < 0.05
55
2.7.7 Models By Respondents’ Political Party
The three models below present the same models presented in the body of the paper
but subset by respondents’ political party. The Democrat models include those who identify
as Democrats and those who identify as independents but more closely identify with the
Democratic Party than the Republican Party. The Republican models include those who
identify as Republicans and those who identify as independents but more closely identify
with the Republican Party than the Democratic Party.
Table 2.8: Models Subset by Respondents’ Party
Support Time Sincere Selfish
Candidate Traits Dems Reps Dems Reps Dems Reps Dems Reps
Woman 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06∗ −0.04 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Black −0.03 −0.02 0.00 0.00 −0.03 0.01 −0.01 −0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Single −0.06 −0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 −0.04 −0.04 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
No children −0.16∗ −0.05 0.28∗ 0.28∗ −0.16∗ −0.11∗ 0.08∗ 0.05
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Vignette 2 0.14∗ −0.04 0.04 0.04 −0.05 −0.04 0.05 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Vignette 3 0.08∗ −0.07∗ 0.03 0.03 −0.07∗ −0.08∗ 0.09∗ 0.12∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Intercept 4.93∗ 5.15∗ 4.11∗ 4.11∗ 2.48∗ 2.58∗ 1.04∗ 1.11∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Adj. R2 0.00 −0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Num. obs. 4837 4567 4834 4834 4815 4553 4822 4549
∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.9: Models Subset by Respondents’ Party
Compassionate Emotional Decisive Tough
Candidate Traits Dems Reps Dems Reps Dems Reps Dems Reps
Woman 0.07∗ 0.10∗ −0.00 −0.00 0.03 0.04 0.10∗ 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Black −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02 −0.00 −0.03 0.01 −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Single −0.03 −0.01 0.03 0.03 −0.01 −0.01 0.00 −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
No children −0.18∗ −0.15∗ −0.17∗ −0.17∗ −0.07∗ 0.01 −0.09∗ −0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Vignette 2 −0.05∗ −0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 −0.03 −0.02 −0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Vignette 3 −0.07∗ −0.09∗ −0.01 −0.01 −0.00 −0.07∗ 0.00 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Intercept 2.46∗ 2.50∗ 1.95∗ 1.95∗ 2.28∗ 2.36∗ 2.15∗ 2.25∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Adj. R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00
Num. obs. 4817 4552 4819 4819 4820 4549 4820 4553
∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.10: Models Subset by Respondents’ Party
Values Rep Me Fam Issues Ideology
Candidate Traits Dems Reps Dems Reps Dems Reps Dems Reps
Woman 0.04 0.02 0.11∗ 0.11∗ 0.07 0.11∗ −0.03 −0.14∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Black −0.00 0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.00 0.01 −0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Single −0.04 −0.04 −0.06 −0.06 −0.06 −0.04 −0.02 −0.14∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
No children −0.13∗ −0.14∗ −0.11∗ −0.11∗ −0.36∗ −0.31∗ 0.12∗ 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Vignette 2 0.06∗ −0.07∗ 0.05 0.05 −0.02 −0.08∗ −0.03 −0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Vignette 3 −0.05 −0.20∗ −0.03 −0.03 −0.27∗ −0.34∗ 0.03 −0.14∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Intercept 4.29∗ 4.58∗ 4.16∗ 4.16∗ 4.65∗ 4.77∗ 2.33∗ 3.29∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
R2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00
Adj. R2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00
Num. obs. 4834 4567 4831 4831 4802 4534 4818 4559
RMSE 1.30 1.36 1.34 1.34 1.31 1.34 1.37 1.71
N Clusters 1665 1577 1665 1665 1663 1574 1663 1576
∗p < 0.05
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2.7.8 Models By Respondents’ Gender
The three models below present the same models presented in the body of the paper but
subset by respondents’ gender.
Table 2.11: Models Subset by Respondents’ Gender
Support Time Sincere Selfish
Candidate Traits Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Woman −0.02 0.09∗ −0.06 −0.01 0.03 0.08∗ −0.02 −0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Black −0.02 −0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 −0.04 −0.04 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Single −0.03 −0.07 −0.02 −0.02 0.01 −0.01 0.02 −0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
No children −0.03 −0.17∗ 0.20∗ 0.39∗ −0.09∗ −0.18∗ 0.04 0.09∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Vignette 2 0.01 0.09∗ −0.01 0.08∗ −0.04 −0.05∗ 0.03 0.06∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Vignette 3 −0.09∗ 0.10∗ −0.06 0.11∗ −0.09∗ −0.05∗ 0.12∗ 0.10∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Intercept 5.17∗ 4.92∗ 4.45∗ 3.98∗ 2.56∗ 2.50∗ 1.28∗ 0.89∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Adj. R2 −0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Num. obs. 4570 4834 4569 4832 4552 4816 4555 4816
∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.12: Models Subset by Respondents’ Gender
Compassionate Emotional Decisive Tough
Candidate Traits Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Woman 0.05 0.11∗ 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.07∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Black 0.03 −0.04 −0.03 −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 0.02 −0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Single −0.05 0.00 0.02 −0.05 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
No children −0.12∗ −0.21∗ −0.15∗ −0.20∗ −0.01 −0.05 −0.02 −0.07∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Vignette 2 0.02 −0.08∗ 0.01 0.02 −0.01 0.00 −0.02 −0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Vignette 3 −0.06∗ −0.09∗ −0.01 −0.00 −0.05 −0.02 0.00 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Intercept 2.48∗ 2.48∗ 2.17∗ 1.93∗ 2.37∗ 2.27∗ 2.24∗ 2.17∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Adj. R2 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.00
Num. obs. 4552 4817 4555 4814 4551 4818 4554 4819
∗p < 0.05
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Table 2.13: Models Subset by Respondents’ Gender
Values Rep Me Fam Issues Ideology
Candidate Traits Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Woman −0.02 0.06 0.02 0.12∗ 0.05 0.11∗ −0.08 −0.10∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Black −0.00 0.02 −0.02 0.02 0.02 −0.03 −0.01 −0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Single 0.01 −0.09∗ −0.03 −0.11∗ −0.01 −0.09∗ −0.11∗ −0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
No children −0.08 −0.19∗ −0.04 −0.10∗ −0.25∗ −0.41∗ 0.11∗ 0.09∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Vignette 2 0.01 −0.02 −0.00 0.02 −0.05 −0.04 −0.05 −0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Vignette 3 −0.14∗ −0.11∗ −0.11∗ −0.03 −0.34∗ −0.26∗ −0.07 −0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Intercept 4.54∗ 4.34∗ 4.43∗ 4.12∗ 4.74∗ 4.68∗ 2.71∗ 2.90∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
Adj. R2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
Num. obs. 4569 4832 4567 4829 4535 4801 4554 4823
∗p < 0.05
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Figure 2.21: Candidate Support by Respondents’ Party & Gender
Note: This figure presents support for candidates by respondents’ political party or gender. This
figure highlights that it was women and Democrats who demonstrated significantly more support for
candidates with children than those without children.
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2.7.10 Ordered Logit Models
In the body of this paper, all models presented are OLS regression models. The decision
to use OLS was made because linear regression offers more easily interpretable coefficients
and is appropriate when used for experiments, even when the dependent variable is not
continuous. However, as a robustness check, I also ran all models as ordered logit models,
which are presented below. In comparing all coefficients between the OLS models and ordered
logit models, results are nearly the same and there are only two significant differences. In
the OLS model for the dependent variable tough, the coefficient for candidates with children
is significant, and in the ordered logit, the p-value for this coefficient is 0.06. Secondly, in
the OLS model for the dependent variable family issues, marital status is not significant, but
in the ordered logit model it is statistically significant.
Table 2.14: Ordered Logit Models
Warmth Feminine Traits
Support Time Sincere Selfish Compassion Emotional
Woman 0.06 −0.03 0.10∗ −0.05 0.14∗ 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Black −0.04 0.01 −0.00 −0.03 −0.00 −0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Single −0.06 −0.01 0.01 −0.03 −0.03 −0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
No children −0.14∗ 0.41∗ −0.25∗ 0.11∗ −0.31∗ −0.29∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Vignette 2 0.08 0.07 −0.07 0.08 −0.05 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Vignette 3 0.03 0.06 −0.13∗ 0.17∗ −0.13∗ −0.03
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
AIC 31650.26 29863.64 26639.60 26082.14 26629.64 27864.10
Num. obs. 9404 9401 9368 9371 9369 9369
∗p < 0.05
63
Table 2.15: Ordered Logit Models
Masculine Traits
Decisive Tough Values Rep Me Fam Issues Ideology
Woman 0.06 0.11∗ 0.04 0.10∗ 0.11∗ −0.11∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Black −0.02 −0.01 0.01 0.00 −0.01 −0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Single −0.01 −0.00 −0.06 −0.09∗ −0.08∗ −0.10∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
No children −0.06 −0.07 −0.18∗ −0.10∗ −0.45∗ 0.11∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Vignette 2 −0.00 −0.02 0.01 0.02 −0.06 −0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Vignette 3 −0.05 0.01 −0.15∗ −0.08 −0.42∗ −0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
AIC 26963.57 27035.21 30104.11 30713.87 29248.38 33692.27
Num. obs. 9369 9373 9401 9396 9336 9377
∗p < 0.05
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2.7.11 Models by Vignette
In this experiment, respondents evaluated three separate vignettes. In most models,
I analyze all vignette in the same model and include an independent variable for which
vignette was being evaluated. However, as a robustness check, I ran all models separated
out by vignette number, and present the results for two of my dependent variables below. All
coefficients were in the same direction across vignette number. I find similar results across
vignette number.
Table 2.16: Models by Vignette Num
Support Time
Vig 1 Vig 2 Vig 3 Vig 1 Vig 2 Vig 3
Woman 0.05 0.03 0.04 −0.01 −0.10∗ 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Black 0.01 −0.06 −0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Single 0.00 −0.10 −0.05 −0.04 −0.03 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
No children −0.15∗ −0.12∗ −0.05 0.37∗ 0.29∗ 0.22∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Intercept 5.01∗ 5.14∗ 5.03∗ 4.17∗ 4.29∗ 4.24∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
Adj. R2 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
Num. obs. 3230 3129 3045 3230 3128 3043
∗p < 0.05
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Figure 2.22: Respondents’ Level of Sexism
Note: This figure presents respondents’ level of sexism, with higher scores equally more sexist atti-
tudes. This measure is an additive index constructed from responses to three questions on a 4-point
scale – Most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women; Women can handle
job pressures as well as men (reverse-coded); A husband’s job is to earn money, a wife’s job is to look
























Figure 2.23: Support by Respondents’ Level of Sexism
Note: This figure presents predict support for candidates by gender across the range of respondents’
sexist attitudes. It does not appear that sexism significantly shaped candidate support.
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Figure 2.24: Coefficient Plot: Respondents Who Correctly Answered the Ma-
nipulation Check
Note: This figure presents only respondents who correctly answered the manipulation check. Because
the manipulation check was only answered after the third vignette, this model only include responses




Making the Personal Political: Support for
Unconventional Congressional Candidates
3.1 Introduction
Recent years have been record-breaking for the diverse types of candidates seeking and
winning seats on Capitol Hill. For example, in 2013, Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona was sworn
into office as the first openly bisexual legislator to serve in Congress. Elected in 2018,
Rep. Katie Porter was the first single mother of young children elected to the House of
Representatives. While these legislators reflect a shift toward more diversity in Congress,
the reality is that lawmakers continue to be rather homogenous in terms of backgrounds
and identity groups. Even today, the life experiences and backgrounds of those serving in
Washington D.C. do not well reflect the diversity of those they represent.
Much of the past research exploring why Congress is unrepresentative of the populations
it serves has focused on gender and race and ethnicity. This project builds on this line of
research to examine how other identities impact how voters evaluate candidates. Specifically,
I am interested in how candidates’ personal lives, including their relationship status, children,
and sexuality, impact how voters perceive them, and ultimately, if candidates who deviate
from the personal background of a typical politician face electoral obstacles.
69
When people think about politicians, they are most likely to visualize who has tradi-
tionally served in politics – White, straight men who are married with older children. Yet,
this image is incompatible with the growing diversity of the United States population. Over
the past 50 years, the personal lives of Americans progressively look more varied. For ex-
ample, more Americans than ever openly identify as LGBTQ+, there has been a dramatic
decline in marriages, and increasingly individuals choose to postpone parenthood until later
in life (Mortelmans, Matthijs, Alofs & Segaert 2016). Therefore, as the country diversifies
in terms of lifestyles and living arrangements, we should expect that increasingly the types
of candidates seeking elected office may come from less conventional backgrounds.
Furthermore, we know diversity in government matters. For example, mothers in
Congress are more likely to sponsor bills aimed at addressing family and children is-
sues, and LGBTQ legislators prioritize the passage of bills that most directly impact
the LGBTQ community as compared to their straight, cisgender colleagues (Bryant &
Marin Hellwege 2019, Haider-Markel 2010, Reynolds 2013). Therefore, we need a better
understanding of the political environment these types of candidates with less traditional
personal identities face and potential obstacles for creating a more representative institution.
Using a conjoint experiment of nearly 3,000 respondents, this project explores voters’
preferences and attitudes toward candidates that do not fit the stereotypical image of a
member of Congress. Respondents viewed a pair of hypothetical candidates, who were
randomly assigned seven different characteristics, including relationship status, children,
and sexuality. Respondents were then asked to make a binary choice on which of the two
candidates they would be more likely to support in a congressional primary.
Overall, I expect respondents will be more likely to support candidates with more tra-
ditional backgrounds, such that preferred candidates will be straight, married, and have
older children. Beyond understanding baseline support, I want to examine three potential
explanations for how and why respondents make their voting decisions and evaluation of
candidates, including a sense of shared values, ability to govern, and perceived ideology. I
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expect voters may be less likely to support unconventional candidates because they view
these candidates as less likely to share their values, less able to handle the responsibilities of
governing, and less congruent with their own ideology.
Ultimately, I find a candidate’s sexuality, relationship status, and parental status do
influence voters’ evaluations. Respondents favor candidates who fit the more traditional
politician mold, including a stronger preference for married, straight candidates with older
children. Republicans and older respondents expressed a stronger preference for more con-
ventional candidates. The biggest effect size of these three personal candidate characteristics
was sexuality. Gay and bisexual candidates were viewed as sharing fewer values with voters
than straight candidates and were stereotyped as overall more liberal. For Democratic re-
spondents, similar to Republicans, they rated gay and bisexual candidates as sharing fewer
values with themselves; however, this stereotype did not decrease overall support among
Democrats, as it did for Republicans. This may be explained by the fact that gay and bi-
sexual candidates were stereotyped as overall more liberal, which is a disadvantage among
Republican voters but a potential advantage with Democrats.
Furthermore, I find women respondents expressed a stronger preference for candidates
who are parents. Gender of the candidate also conditioned preferences for parental status,
such that respondents evaluated men candidates similarly regardless of their parental sta-
tus, but preferred women candidates who had older children as compared to women without
children. Ultimately, this project provides insight into opportunities and obstacles for the
campaigns of unconventional congressional candidates, and how candidates’ personal char-
acteristics shape how voters perceive them and impact voting behavior.
3.2 Diversity in Congress
The identities and life experiences of those who serve in government matters, as these
legislators bring with them a perspective that influences their legislative priorities and voting
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behavior in Congress (Pitkin 1967). Much of the past literature on descriptive representation
in politics has focused on the electoral challenges and congressional behavior of lawmakers by
gender and race or ethnicity. However, increasingly research has examined the behavior and
experiences of other identity groups in politics, including LGBTQ candidates and legislators.
Crowned by the media as a ”Rainbow Wave,” 2018 saw gains in LGBTQ candidates
winning seats in Congress, including Kansas Rep. Sharice Davids as the first openly
gay woman of color in Congress (Stack & Edmondson 2018). Beyond recent successes,
LGBTQ candidates often face challenges in winning votes (Golebiowska & Thomsen 1999,
Golebiowska 2001, Haider-Markel, Miller, Flores, Lewis, Tadlock & Taylor 2017, Herrick &
Thomas 1999, Jones & Brewer 2019). Voters are overall less willing to support LGBTQ
candidates, a bias largely driven by Republicans, conservatives, and religious voters (Doan
& Haider-Markel 2010, Haider-Markel 2010). When LGBTQ candidates do run, they tend
to be strategic, running in more liberal, urban districts where they perceive voters are more
accepting of LGBTQ candidates (Everitt & Camp 2014, Haider-Markel 2010). Furthermore,
rapid shifts in public opinion on LGBTQ issues has overall increased the general willingness
to vote for LGBTQ candidates. For example, a 2019 poll found 68% of voters are either
enthusiastic or comfortable with a gay presidential candidate (Dann 2019).
When it comes to a politician’s relationship and parental status, most members of
Congress are married and wait until their children are grown before seeking elected office
(Carroll & Sanbonmatsu 2013, Conway, Steuernagel & Ahern 2005, Fulton et al. 2006). This
is especially true for women lawmakers. Therefore, a majority of the research on candidates’
family dynamics has predominantly been examined through a gendered lens, such that the
impact of family dynamics is expected to be conditional on gender. The campaign expe-
riences of mothers often differ from fathers, as mothers often face questions and criticism
about who is taking care of their children while they are running for office, implying that
by seeking elected office they are neglecting their motherly duties in a way fathers are not
often confronted with (Zernike 2018). For example, former Massachusetts Governor Jan
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Swift recalled a time a voter asking if she had a boyfriend because the voter worried if Swift
got married and had children, she would be unable to fulfill the requirements of the job
(FiveThirtyEight 2020).
Past research finds voters prefer married parents as candidates, driven more strongly by
conservative voters evaluating single candidates and those without children as less likely to
earn their support (Campbell & Cowley 2018, Greenlee 2014, Stalsburg 2010, Teele, Kalla
& Rosenbluth 2018). This preference for candidates with more traditional family dynamics
disproportionately impacts women candidates, who are more likely to perform a majority of
household task and childcare needs, leaving mothers with less time than fathers to devote
to their political goals (Teele, Kalla & Rosenbluth 2018). Therefore, it is clear that both
sexuality and family dynamics impact how voters assess political candidates, and that gender
may intersect in unique ways with these other identities.
3.3 Theoretical Expectations
While a democracy functions best with an informed electorate who carefully analyzes
the skills and policy positions of candidates for political office, voters often lack the time,
resources, and interest to be fully informed about their options at the ballot box (Carpini &
Keeter 1996). Therefore, voters often use shortcuts to evaluate candidates and craft voting
decisions (Crowder-Meyer, Gadarian & Trounstine 2020, Lupia 1994) The most influential
shortcuts guiding modern voting is political party, yet in primaries, voters lack this useful
cue, making acquiring information about candidates and their policy preferences costly.
Primaries are therefore likely when candidates’ personal characteristics play a bigger role in
shaping voting decisions (Hirano & Snyder Jr 2019, Kirkland & Coppock 2018b).
When voters have limited knowledge about candidates, they may incorporate information
forged by their own past experiences or societal stereotypes to guide their voting decisions,
regardless of if these stereotypes accurately apply to the candidate being evaluated or not
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(Popkin 2020). In applying this argument to aspects of candidates’ personal lives, I outline
below three potential explanations – values, ideology, and abilities – for how voters might use
aspects of a candidate’s personal identity to draw conclusions about the individual’s fitness
for office.
3.3.1 Candidate Values
A candidate’s personal attributes may be used as a shortcut by voters to make assump-
tions about the candidate’s values and how those values may or may not align with one’s
own beliefs and principles. Voters tend to favor candidates who look and think like them,
as individuals feel more comfortable around those with whom they share identity groups
(Besley & Coate 1997). Voters who share an identity with a candidate are more likely to
perceive that candidate is relatable and share their values. Ultimately, this perception may
lead voters to assume candidates who are more similar to themselves will have a better un-
derstanding of what issues and policies are a priority for that voter and this will be reflected
in their legislative behavior.
Specifically, being married and having children may send a signal to some voters, espe-
cially those who are themselves married with children, that the candidate is more relatable
and possesses traditional family values. Voters may also view candidates with families as
better able to understand and prioritize policies that most directly impact families and thus
may increase their likelihood of supporting these candidates. Even for those not married
and without children, they may envision themselves one day fulfilling those identities or at a
minimum likely view these characteristics as “ideal” in a culture centered around the nuclear
family.
Furthermore, much of the discussion around LGBTQ issues in the United States is framed
as value-based, which likely has consequences for how voters perceive the values of LGBTQ
candidates. Americans remain divided, with some believing being gay is a lifestyle choice and
others that an individual is born gay (Center 2015b). For those who view a queer individual
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as choosing their sexuality, they view this as an active choice to abandon traditional lifestyle
decisions and values. Therefore, some may view LGBTQ politicians as less able to serve
ethically and perform their necessary professional duties, thus decreasing support (Jones &
Cox 2016).
3.3.2 Candidate Ideology
Secondly, voters may use candidates’ personal characteristics to infer the candidate’s
ideology.1 Past research finds voters’ perceived ideology of a candidate is shaped by the
candidate’s gender, race, and social class (Carnes & Sadin 2015, King & Matland 2003,
Koch 2000, McDermott 1998). Based on a candidate’s traits, voters may make assumptions
about the individual’s lived experiences and political background and how these events have
shaped their political preferences and ideology. For example, because LGBTQ individuals
are more likely to have experienced discrimination as compared to straight, cisgender people,
one might assume LGBTQ politicians are more liberal on issues related to equality and anti-
discrimination. At times, stereotypes about identity and ideology can supersede party, such
that past research finds transgender candidates are perceived as more liberal than cisgender
candidates, regardless of political party (Jones & Brewer 2019).
3.3.3 Candidate Ability
Finally, a candidate’s personal traits may send a signal to voters about the candidate’s
quality and abilities to serve in government. Certain personal attributes may trigger a
connection to either positive or negative trait evaluations. For example, past research finds
voters often assign trait evaluations to candidates based solely on their gender (Fox & Oxley
2003). Men are perceived as more competent and better able to handle crisis, while women
are stereotyped as more compassionate and gentle (Branton, English, Pettey & Barnes 2018,
1In this section, I present a candidate’s perceived values and perceived ideology as two separate concepts,
but in reality, it is likely these two concepts are intertwined. Especially for the most ideologically extreme
voters, I expect a strong correlation between perceived values and perceived ideology.
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Huddy & Terkildsen 1993). A similar mechanism may be at play with other candidate
identities, such that candidates who are married and are parents may be perceived as more
hard-working, likeable, better time management skills, or as having more energy, while
single candidates without children may be perceived as more selfish or as poor decision-
makers (Ganong & Coleman 1995). Candidates who openly identify as LGBTQ may be
stereotyped as less honest and less moral, leading to decreased electoral support (Doan &
Haider-Markel 2010).
Stereotypes about what traits candidates do or do not possess may also lead voters to
perceive some candidates are better able to handle certain types of policy issues. For ex-
ample, because women are stereotyped as more compassionate, they are perceived as better
able to handle social welfare issues than are men (Huddy & Terkildsen 1993). This con-
nection between traits and issue competence may be especially consequential for LGBTQ
candidates. A prevalent obstacle for many LGBTQ candidates is being seen as a multi-
dimensional candidate. Often queer politicians are stereotyped as solely focused on issues
concerning the LGBTQ community, rather than as a candidate who is invested in a diverse
array of policy concerns (Golebiowska 2002, Kluttz 2014). Stereotypes of a candidate’s traits
and issue competence likely shape overall evaluations and ultimately voting decisions.
3.3.4 Heterogeneous Effects
Collectively, I expect voters prefer candidates with more conventional characteristics;
however, I expect this preference is more strongly driven by Republicans and older re-
spondents. The Republican Party is often framed as the party of traditional family values
(Dowland 2015, Jost, Nosek & Gosling 2008). Residents in conservative states are more
likely to be married, and children in conservative states are more likely to live in two-parent
households (Wilcox 2015a, Wilcox 2015b). Conservatives are also more likely to express
they are troubled by the decline in marriage rates (Pew Research 2010). Therefore, I expect
Republicans have a heightened preference for candidates who are married and have children.
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As related to sexuality, I expect that opposition to LGBTQ candidates is concentrated
among Republicans, conservatives, and older voters. These demographics are the most likely
to say that, “homosexuality should be discouraged by society,” while Democrats and younger
people are more accepting of the LGBTQ community (Center 2017). Furthermore, because
views on sexuality are so closely tied with the religious community, and White Evangelicals
are a strong voting base of the GOP, I expect that queer candidates face greater obstacles
in pursuing a primary run within the Republican Party. GOP voters may also stereotype
LGBTQ candidates as more liberal, and thus, more ideologically distant from themselves,
leading to decreased support.
The theory laid out above about how characteristics of candidates’ personal lives influence
how voters evaluate politicians’ values, ideology, and ability leads to the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. Support will be greater for married candidates than unmarried candidates.
Hypothesis 2. Support will be greater for candidates with children than candidates without
children.
Hypothesis 3. Support will be greater for straight candidates than gay or bisexual candidates.
Hypothesis 4. The preference for more conventional candidates will be driven by Republicans,
conservatives, and older respondents.
3.4 Data & Methods
This project explores voters’ candidate preferences through a conjoint experiment that
varies multiple character traits.2 Conjoint analyses, while more traditionally used in mar-
keting research, have proven to be a useful methodological approach for political science,
especially in examining multifaceted individual-level decision making (Hainmueller, Hopkins
& Yamamoto 2014, Hainmueller & Hopkins 2015, Kirkland & Coppock 2018b). In a conjoint
experiment, respondents are presented with two options, both of which have been randomly
2A potential limitation of using an online survey conjoint experiment is concern that respondents would
infer the goals or hypotheses of the study, thus biasing responses; however, recent research finds that even
when respondents in online survey experiments are told the researchers’ goals, their responses do not change
(Mummolo & Peterson 2019).
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assigned various characteristics. Respondents are then asked to select which of the two op-
tions they prefer. This design allows for the simultaneous estimation of the causal effect
of multiple candidate characteristics on how respondents evaluate candidates (Hainmueller,
Hopkins & Yamamoto 2014). This method also provides more external validity as compared
to more traditional survey experiments because rather than respondents assessing one can-
didate at a time, it better mimics voters’ experience at the ballot box where voters often
must decide based on comparing the various candidate options.
Much of the prior conjoint experiments in political science have presented findings in
terms of the Average Marginal Component-Specific Effect (AMCE); however, in analyzing
my results, I follow the recommendations of Leeper, Hobolt & Tilley (2019) and present
my findings as marginal means.3 AMCEs, particularly when used for analysis on subsets of
the sample, can present biased results because the attribute estimates are contingent on the
reference category selected by the researcher.4 In comparison, marginal means are estimates
that do not require the selection of a reference category, and instead, can be interpreted
as the probability a trait is favored by respondents, marginalized across all other attributes
(Leeper, Hobolt & Tilley 2020, Saha & Weeks 2020).
In this conjoint experiment, respondents were shown an introduction where they are
instructed they will be shown a pair of candidates running for their party’s primary for an
open seat for the U.S. House of Representatives. Each respondent evaluated two pairs of
candidates, for a total of four candidates. I chose to frame this conjoint experiment as a
primary because, as mentioned above, partisanship strongly drives general election voting
decisions. Therefore, it is likely in primaries, when voters cannot rely on party to make their
decision, where candidates’ personal characteristics play a more prominent role in guiding
or influencing vote choice.
Respondents were shown two profiles that have randomized seven candidate attributes
3Also see Neuner & Wratil 2020 for a detailed explanation of the differences between AMCE and marginal
means
4While some authors have a strong theoretical justification for which attributes they select as their
reference categories, this choice is often arbitrary or based on weak theoretical expectations.
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– sexuality, children, relationship status, gender, race/ethnicity, occupation, and age. Table
3.1 displays the chosen character traits for each category, and Figure 3.1 shows an example
of how the candidates were presented to respondents in the survey. For each character
category, one (or more) of the options represent a more “traditional” candidate or a trait
that represents the majority of members of Congress. The other options represent less
traditional candidate traits. For example, most members of Congress are straight, which
in this experiment represents the more conventional candidate trait, while gay and bisexual
represent the less conventional sexuality traits.
Regarding my theoretical expectations about family dynamics, I vary both the candi-
date’s relationship status and children. For relationship status, married represents the con-
ventional candidate, and the other three options – single, cohabiting partner, and divorced
– were chosen to represent the growing diversity of households in the United States. The
past several decades have witnessed a decline in two-parent households and more adults
experiencing divorce or cohabitation (Center 2015a). For children, most candidates tend
to wait until their children are older before seeking elected office, so 2 children ages 17 &
19 represents the conventional candidate. The less conventional children traits are having
younger children (ages 3 & 6) and no children. While there has been prior research which
has examined voter support for diverse types of candidates, much of this literature has been
limited in the diversity it explores. For example, past studies have not examined ages of
children, cohabiting partner, or bisexuality. If we truly hope to understand the political en-
vironment diverse candidates face, this study expands our current understanding to examine
these candidate traits ignored by past research.
While sexuality and family dynamics are my primary theoretical interests, I incorporate
other candidate traits into this experiment, including gender, race/ethnicity, and occupation,
to explore potential interaction effects, as well as to throw off respondents from detecting
the true intentions of the experiment and biasing the results. For the candidate’s occupa-
tion, I incorporated six occupations, of which three fall more into the conventional candidate
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category as political insiders – city council member, congressional staffer, and political con-
sultant. Less conventional occupations included nurse, radio talk show host, and ironworker.
The candidate’s gender is varied between male and female, and race/ethnicity is varied
between White, Black, Hispanic, and Asian.
I include the ages of children in the conjoint, therefore was concerned respondents would
infer the candidate’s age based on this information. If this occurred, it would be unclear if
an effect for the children attribute could be attributed to having children or the perceived
age of the candidate. To potentially alleviate this concern, I incorporated the candidate’s
age into the conjoint. Because I do not have any theoretical expectations or interests related
to or conditional on candidate’s age, I selected three ages which are quite similar.
Table 3.1: Conjoint Experiment Candidate Attributes
Relationship status Married; Single; Cohabiting partner; Divorced
Children 2 children ages 17 & 19; 2 children ages 3 & 6; None
Sexuality Straight; gay; bisexual
Occupation City council member; Congressional staffer; Political consultant;
Nurse; Ironworker; Radio talk show host
Race/Ethnicity White, Black, Hispanic, Asian
Gender Male; Female
Age 43; 45; 46
Note: Each candidate profile was randomly assigned one of the characteristics from each attribute
category. The order in which the attributes appeared was also randomized. Based on the number of
attributes included in this conjoint, there are a total of 5,184 possible combinations of attributes.
After viewing the two profiles, respondents were asked to decide which of the two candi-
dates they would be more likely to support in their party’s congressional primary. A binary
choice is traditional for conjoint experiments; however, for this project I wanted to incorpo-
rate other questions to better understanding the causal story behind respondents’ candidate
choices. For example, Teele, Kalla, and Rosenbluth (2018) use a conjoint experiment to ex-
plore preferences of women candidates, finding that voters prefer candidates with traditional
households, but without further investigation, it is unclear why this is. The authors can only
theorize why respondents selected the candidate they did.
Therefore, to explore possible reasons behind respondents’ voting decisions, respondents
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answered three further questions about each candidate to gauge how respondents assesses
each of the hypothetical candidates. I asked respondents how strongly they perceive each
candidate shares similar values to their own, how strongly they perceive each candidate has
the time, energy, and ability to handle the responsibilities of governing, and their perception
of each candidate’s ideology.5 These three questions had respondents answer on a 7-point
scale, and for the analysis, each was rescaled to range from 0 to 1.
Figure 3.1: Example of Conjoint Experiment
Note: This is an example of what respondents’ screens looked like during the survey conjoint experi-
ment. Candidate characteristics were randomized, and the order in which the characteristics appeared
was also randomized.
This conjoint experiment was run in September 2020 with the online survey company
Lucid, which provides a nationally representative sample on age, gender, race, income, and
political party. The survey included nearly 3,000 respondents. For complete surveys, the
analysis includes a sample size of more than 11,500. Because each respondent has multiple
observations within each model, the standard errors are clustered by respondent. See the
appendix for a complete table of the demographics of this survey sample. In this sample,
71% of respondents identify as White. The sample includes a good mix along partisan
and ideological lines, with 39% identifying as Democrats, 36% as Republicans, and 25% as
Independents. However, the sample does appear to be more educated than the county as a
5See the appendix for exact question wording.
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whole, as 44% of this sample has a bachelor’s degree or higher. Overall, this is a high-quality
sample that well reflects many of the important political demographics relevant to this study.
3.5 Results
In my analysis, I first present the findings for my four dependent variables – binary choice,
shared values, ability to govern, and ideology – for the full sample, followed by models broken
out by respondents’ demographic characteristics and interaction effects between candidate
attributes. Figure 3.2 displays the results for all respondents when they had to make a
binary choice between two candidates. In Figure 3.2, the x-axis reflects the probability
that a respondent will select a candidate with that given characteristic as their preferred
candidate. The dotted vertical line at 0.5 is a reference point, such that any attribute
with a greater than 0.5 marginal mean signifies that a candidate that possesses that feature
increases the probability that candidate will be selected as the respondent’s preferred choice.
Therefore, any attribute with a marginal mean of less than 0.5 means the given attribute
decreases overall favorability toward candidates with that trait.
As visualized in Figure 3.2, sexuality, children, and relationship status all appeared to
have a significant effect on candidate selection. Respondents were significantly more likely
to select straight candidates (0.57) and least likely to choose gay candidates (0.45). The
probability of a gay candidate being selected was 0.12 lower than a straight candidate.
While bisexual candidates were significantly more likely to picked than gay candidates, they
were significantly less preferred as compared to straight candidates.
For parental status, the most preferred was candidates with older children (0.52), signif-
icantly higher than support for candidates with no children (0.48). Respondents expressed
a clear preference for married candidates, preferring this to all other candidate relationship
types. The least preferred was divorced candidates (0.46), whereas single and cohabiting

























































































0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60
Probability that candidate will be chosen
Figure 3.2: Marginal Means for Candidate Attributes: Binary Choice
Note: The dependent variable is the binary choice of which candidate respondents would be more
likely to support in their party’s congressional primary. This figure presents marginal means with
95% confidence intervals. The black dashed line indicates a probability of 0.5.
Figure 3.3 visualizes respondents’ perception of shared values with candidates based
on their characteristics. Because the remaining three of my four dependent variables are
not binary as the first figure was, these variables were rescaled to range between 0 and
1. However, because these variables are not binary, the below figures are not as directly
interpretable as the first figure. Rather than seeing if an attribute has a greater or less than
0.5 probability of being selected, in Figure 3.3 it is most useful to compare attributes to each
other.
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Whereas I found voters expressed an overall preference for parents and married candi-
dates, in Figure 3.3 I do not find that either parental or marital status influence perceive
shared values with a candidate. Therefore, it does not appear shared values is the mech-
anism driving the effect for these attributes. However, candidates’ sexuality did influence
perceived shared values. Respondents were significantly more likely to say they share values
with a straight candidate as compared to either a gay or bisexual candidate. There was
not a significant difference between gay and bisexual candidate. Collectively, I find that
respondents’ perception of shared values for candidates based on sexuality aligned with re-
spondents’ binary choice selection of overall support. However, I did not find that a greater
sense of shared values with parents or married candidates was what drove greater overall
support for these candidates. These findings seem to highlight that while sometimes per-
ceiving shared values with a candidate aligns with voting decisions, at other times, it does
not entirely shape voting behavior.
Figure 3.4 displays the marginal means for respondents’ perceptions of a candidate’s
time, energy, and ability to handle the responsibilities of governing. Similar to the past
two figures, I find queer candidates are disadvantaged, such that straight candidates are
perceived as having significantly more ability to govern than are gay or bisexual candidates.
While I do not find any significant effects for relationship, I do find those with no children
were perceived to have significantly more time, energy, and ability to govern than parents.
Candidates with young children were viewed as having the least time and energy to govern.
While candidates who are parents were disadvantaged on this measure, it did not appear
to influence respondents’ willingness to vote for parents, as parents were preferred in overall
support.
The fourth dependent variable is perceived ideology of the candidate. Because respon-
dents were instructed to assume each candidate was a member of the political party they
most identify with, I do not present the findings for ideology for the full sample but only

























































































0.575 0.600 0.625 0.650
Probability that candidate shares similar values to my own
Figure 3.3: Marginal Means for Candidate Attributes: Shared Values
Note: The dependent variable is a 7-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree rescaled to
range from 0 to 1 for perceived shared values with a candidate. This figure presents marginal means
with 95% confidence intervals.
considers differences in findings across subgroups of respondents for all four of my dependent
variables.
3.5.1 Results by Respondents’ Traits
First, I examine how self-identified Democrats, Republicans, and Independents perceived
candidates, based on the candidate’s sexuality. Figure 3.5 presents this analysis for three


























































































Probability that candidate has the time, energy, 
 and ability to handle the responsibilities of governing
Figure 3.4: Marginal Means for Candidate Attributes: Ability to Govern
Note: The dependent variable is a 7-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree rescaled to
range from 0 to 1 for perceived time, energy, and ability to handle the responsibilities of governing.
This figure presents marginal means with 95% confidence intervals.
respondents had to make a binary choice between two candidates, a respondent’s political
party conditioned their probability of selecting a candidate based on their sexuality. For
Democratic respondents, there were not significant differences in which candidates they
favored based on sexuality. Democrats were nearly equally likely to pick a straight, gay, or
bisexual candidate. For Independents, there was no difference in their favorability toward gay
and bisexual candidates, but they were significantly more likely to pick straight candidates.
Republican respondents were the least likely to pick a gay candidate (0.4), and were most
likely to pick a straight candidate (0.62), in-line with Hypothesis 4 that Republicans would
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drive the preferences for more conventional candidates.
In the middle of Figure 3.5 is perceived shared values by a candidate’s sexuality condi-
tional on a respondent’s party. I find for both Republicans and Independents, they perceive
they share significantly more values with straight candidates as compared to either gay or bi-
sexual. While Democratic respondents were not less likely to vote for queer candidates, I do
find Democrats perceive bisexual candidates share fewer values with them than do straight
candidates; however, the effect size is much smaller than for Republicans or Independents.
This finding for Democrats is notably interesting because in the flow of the survey, re-
spondents first answered the binary choice of which candidate to support and then were
immediately asked to rate how much they perceived they shared values with each candidate.
Because these questions were shown sequentially, it could be expected that a respondent’s
first decision of which candidate to support might color how they answer other questions on
the candidates. However, with the sexuality of the candidate, I find that Democratic respon-
dents were willing to support the gay and bisexual candidates but then turn right around in
the next question and say they did not share as many values with these candidates.
Finally, the right most visualization in Figure 3.5 displays perceived ideology by respon-
dents’ party. Republicans and Independents rated straight candidates as significantly more
conservative than both gay or bisexual candidates. Neither group of respondents perceived
an ideological difference between gay and bisexual candidates. This stereotype likely dis-
advantages queer Republicans candidates, particularly in primary elections, such as this
experiment is framed, as Republican primaries are where candidates must appeal to the
more conservative wing of the party.
Democratic respondents also perceive straight candidates as more conservative than either
gay or bisexual candidates, but this is not the same disadvantage it is for queer Republican
candidates. Being stereotyped as more liberal might advantage Democratic gay or bisex-
ual candidates in their primary among more liberal voters. However, this does not mean










































































































Figure 3.5: Marginal Means for Candidates’ Sexuality by Respondents’ Political
Party
Note: This figure presents marginal means with 95% confidence intervals by respondents’ political
party.
have to appeal to a more diverse voting bloc. Therefore, across several of the dependent
variables, respondents’ political party conditioned their responses to candidates’ sexualities,
with Republicans displaying the greatest differences in how they assess straight versus queer
candidates.
In looking at how respondents’ party conditioned their response to candidates’ parental
and marital status, I find there were not as great of effect sizes as there were for sexuality.
However, there was a distinction in how Republicans and Democrats perceived shared values
with candidates based on relationship status. I find Democrats and Independents do not
significantly differ in perceived shared values based on a candidate’s marital status. However,
Republicans significantly prefer married candidates as compared to divorced candidates.
Counter to initial expectations, Republicans did not punish single or cohabiting candidates.
Beyond respondent’s party, I expect gender likely also conditions how respondents react
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Probability that candidate shares similar values to my own
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Figure 3.6: Marginal Means for Candidates’ Relationship by Respondents’ Po-
litical Party
Note: This figure presents marginal means with 95% confidence intervals by respondents’ political
party.
differently based on their parental status. On the left side of Figure 3.7, I find that men
respondents did not vary their binary choice of candidates based on their parental status;
however, women respondents expressed a significant preference for candidates with older or
younger children compared to those with no children.
Similarly, on the right side of Figure 3.7, a respondent’s gender influenced their perception
of a candidate’s time and energy to govern. For men respondents, they did not perceive a
difference between candidates with younger and older children, but with a small effect size,
perceived those with no children to have more time and energy to govern. For women
respondents, the age of the children mattered more in perceive ability to govern. Women
evaluated candidates with no children as having the most time and energy to govern and those
with younger children as having significantly less time and energy to govern as compared to
either having older or no children.
Finally, in examining differing candidate evaluations by respondents’ characteristics, I



























































































Figure 3.7: Marginal Means for Candidates’ Parental Status by Respondents’
Gender
Note: This figure presents marginal means with 95% confidence intervals by respondents’ gender.
dents into two group – Generation X and older compared to Millennials and younger.6 Figure
3.8 displays binary choice by respondents’ generation for candidates’ sexuality. I find that
younger respondents significantly prefer straight candidates to gay candidates, but the effect
size is small (0.52 to 0.47). The effect size of a candidate’s sexuality was much greater for
older respondents. Older respondents significantly preferred straight candidates (0.60) to
both bisexual (0.47) and gay (0.44) candidates.
A respondent’s age also had a significant effect on perceived ideology of candidates.
6I use the Pew Research Center classification of generations, which defines the beginning of Millennials
as those born in 1981. Therefore, my first grouping includes the Silent Generation, Baby Boomers, and
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Probability that candidate will be chosen
●Gen X & Older Millennial/Gen Z
Figure 3.8: Marginal Means for Candidates’ Sexuality by Respondents’ Age
Note: This figure presents marginal means with 95% confidence intervals by respondents’ age.
Figure 3.9 visualizes perceived ideology of candidates based on their relationship status.
Younger respondents did not evaluate candidates differently based on their marital status,
but older respondents were more likely to rate married candidates as more conservative.
Older respondents rated candidates with a cohabiting partner as significantly more liberal
than either married or divorced candidates. This section highlights that Republicans, women,
and older respondents are the most likely to prefer more conventional candidates, and are
the types of voters who less traditional candidate may face increased challenges in winning
over.
3.5.2 Interaction Effects
In designing this conjoint, I incorporated a candidate’s gender and race, as I expect both
gender and race may condition how respondents evaluated candidate’s marital and parental
status, as well as sexuality. When I interact a candidate’s gender and parental status, I
find gender does condition preferences for candidate’s parental status. For men candidates,
respondents did not significantly vary in how they evaluated men based on parental status,











Probability that candidate is perceived as ideologically liberal
●Gen X & Older Millennial/Gen Z
Figure 3.9: Marginal Means for Candidates’ Relationship by Respondents’ Age
Note: This figure presents marginal means with 95% confidence intervals by respondents’ age.
older children as compared to no children. This presents a unique challenge for women who
disproportionately handle more of child care needs, taking away time from their political
ambitions, yet women without children are less preferred by voters.
I also tested if a candidate’s race conditioned perceptions of marital and parental status.
For marital status, I do not find a significant interaction. Across racial and ethnic groups,
respondents preferred married to divorced candidates. For parental status, I found a signifi-
cant interaction, such that parental status was more important in how respondents evaluated
Black candidates than other races and ethnicities. Respondents expressed a stronger prefer-
ence for Black candidates with older or younger children than for Black candidates with no
children.
When I incorporate an interaction term between sexuality and gender, I find the least
preferred candidates are gay men. Of the queer candidates, support was highest for bisexual
women, and in the middle, respondents were nearly equally likely to support a bisexual
man or a gay woman. Thus, is it clear that at times, gender and race both intersect with
candidates’ other personal identities to influence voters’ perceptions of candidates.
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3.6 Conclusion
This project set out to explore how receptive voters are to unconventional congressional
candidates. I find there were significant differences in voting preferences based on a can-
didate’s sexuality and family dynamics. I find respondents were significantly more likely
to vote for candidates that are straight, married, and have children. These preferences for
more conventional candidates are more strongly driven by Republicans, women, and older
respondents. At times, I find that a shared sense of values, perceived ability to govern, and
perceived ideology all influenced how voters evaluated candidates.
This project highlights how candidates’ various identities can influence their electoral
environment and how these identities can intersect in unique ways. For example, I find that
overall voters prefer candidates who are parents, but that these attitudes are conditional
on a candidate’s gender and race or ethnicity. Additionally, this project highlights that
candidates who most deviate from the conventional politician image likely face electoral
challenges, especially when facing more conservative and older voters.
These findings suggest that candidates who hold identities that stray from the norm in
politics may have to actively address stereotypes and develop campaign tactics that frame
their appeal to voters and highlight their ability to be successful in elected office. We
have seen successful example of candidates actively addressing these types of issues in their
campaigns. For example, when Stacey Abrams, who is single and does not have children,
ran for Georgia governor in 2018, she ran an ad titled “Foundation,” which highlighted the
importance of her parents in her life, spoke about the importance of family values, and
showed a scene of Abrams sitting down for family dinner with her nieces and nephews.
Additionally, Danica Roem of Virginia was the first openly transgender woman elected to
a state legislature in 2017. In Roem’s campaign, she did not shy away from her gender
identity but she focused much of her time speaking with voters about infrastructure needs,
thus avoiding being stereotyped as a one-issue candidate because of her gender identity and
embracing a policy issue typically framed as less partisan.
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While Congress has diversified in recent years, there are still many firsts yet to be seen,
including the first woman of color Republican senator or first openly transgender member of
Congress. Moving forward, I encourage more research that examines the experiences of less
conventional congressional candidates, including media coverage, campaign strategies, and
voter perceptions. We need more work on where more diverse candidates are running, what
challenges they face, and what impact having more diversity in Congress can have on the
policy making process. Additionally, I encourage more research that expands our definition




Gender : What is your gender? 0= Male, 1= Female, 2= Other (text box fill-in).
Race : What racial or ethnic groups describe you? Mark all that apply. 0= White, 1=
Black or African American, 2= Hispanic or Latino(a), 3= Asian American, 4= Native
American or American Indian, 5= Other. Variable was recoded to White, Black, Latino,
Other, and Mixed.
Ideology : In general, how would you describe your political viewpoint? 0= Very liberal,
1= Liberal, 2= Moderate, 3= Conservative, 4= Very conservative, 5= Not sure. “Not sure”
was recoded to “moderate.”
Party : In general, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent,
or something else? 0= Republican, 1= Democrat, 2= Independent or other party.
Income : What is the annual household income for all members of your family? This figure
should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income. 1= Less
than $10,000, 2= $10,000-$19,999, 3= $20,000-$29,999, 4= $30,000-$39,999, 5= $40,000-
$49,999, 6= $50,000-$59,999, 7= $60,000-$69,999, 8= $70,000-$79,999, 9=$80,000-$89,999,
10= $90,000-$99,999, 11= $100,000-$149,999, 12= More than $150,000.
Education : What is the highest level of education you have completed? 1= Less than
high school diploma, 2= High school graduate or GED, 3= Some college, 4= 2 year degree,
5= 4 year degree, 6= Post-graduate education
3.7.2 Experiment Questions
Introduction: Suppose the individuals below are candidates running in your party’s
primary for an open seat for the U.S. House of Representatives. Examines their profiles and
answer the questions below.
Questions given after seeing the candidate profiles:
• Based on the information in these profiles, which of these two candidates would you be
more likely to support in your party’s congressional primary? Candidate 1; Candidate
2
• Do you agree or disagree with the following statements on Candidate [1/2]? Candidate
[1/2] shares similar values to my own. Strongly agree; Agree; Somewhat agree; Neither
agree nor disagree; Somewhat disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree
• Do you agree or disagree with the following statements on Candidate [1/2]? Candi-
date [1/2] has the time, energy, and ability to handle the responsibilities of governing.
Strongly agree; Agree; Somewhat agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat dis-
agree; Disagree; Strongly disagree
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• How would you rate Candidate [1/2]? Very liberal, Liberal, Somewhat liberal, Middle















































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3: Candidates Traits for the Full Sample
Binary Values Govern
Straight 0.57 (0.01) 0.66 (0.00) 0.65 (0.00)
Bisexual 0.49 (0.01) 0.58 (0.00) 0.61 (0.00)
Gay 0.45 (0.01) 0.59 (0.00) 0.61 (0.00)
Older children 0.52 (0.01) 0.62 (0.00) 0.62 (0.00)
No children 0.48 (0.01) 0.61 (0.00) 0.65 (0.00)
Young children 0.50 (0.01) 0.61 (0.00) 0.61 (0.00)
Married 0.54 (0.01) 0.62 (0.00) 0.63 (0.00)
Cohabiting 0.50 (0.01) 0.61 (0.00) 0.63 (0.00)
Divorced 0.46 (0.01) 0.60 (0.00) 0.62 (0.00)
Single 0.49 (0.01) 0.61 (0.00) 0.63 (0.00)
City council member 0.57 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01)
Congressional staffer 0.51 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01)
Ironworker 0.49 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01)
Nurse 0.52 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01)
Political consultant 0.52 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01)
Radio talk show host 0.39 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01)
Male 0.48 (0.01) 0.61 (0.00) 0.63 (0.00)
Female 0.52 (0.01) 0.62 (0.00) 0.62 (0.00)
White 0.50 (0.01) 0.62 (0.00) 0.63 (0.00)
Asian 0.48 (0.01) 0.60 (0.00) 0.62 (0.00)
Black 0.53 (0.01) 0.61 (0.00) 0.63 (0.00)
Hispanic 0.49 (0.01) 0.61 (0.00) 0.62 (0.00)
45 0.50 (0.01) 0.61 (0.00) 0.63 (0.00)
43 0.51 (0.01) 0.61 (0.00) 0.63 (0.00)
46 0.49 (0.01) 0.61 (0.00) 0.61 (0.00)
N 11754 11750 11737
Note: These models are the estimates and standard errors for the full sample for three
dependent variables, which are visualized in Figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4.
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Table 3.4: Binary Winner Dependent Variable By Respondents’ Party
Dem. Rep. Inde.
Straight 0.51 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.57 (0.02)
Bisexual 0.51 (0.01) 0.48 (0.01) 0.46 (0.02)
Gay 0.49 (0.01) 0.40 (0.01) 0.47 (0.02)
Older children 0.52 (0.01) 0.51 (0.01) 0.54 (0.02)
No children 0.47 (0.01) 0.48 (0.01) 0.47 (0.02)
Young children 0.51 (0.01) 0.50 (0.01) 0.49 (0.02)
Married 0.53 (0.01) 0.54 (0.02) 0.55 (0.02)
Cohabiting 0.52 (0.01) 0.49 (0.02) 0.50 (0.02)
Divorced 0.46 (0.02) 0.45 (0.02) 0.47 (0.02)
Single 0.49 (0.01) 0.51 (0.02) 0.49 (0.02)
City council member 0.60 (0.02) 0.56 (0.02) 0.54 (0.02)
Congressional staffer 0.54 (0.02) 0.50 (0.02) 0.49 (0.02)
Ironworker 0.45 (0.02) 0.52 (0.02) 0.50 (0.02)
Nurse 0.53 (0.02) 0.49 (0.02) 0.55 (0.02)
Political consultant 0.51 (0.02) 0.51 (0.02) 0.53 (0.02)
Radio talk show host 0.36 (0.02) 0.42 (0.02) 0.40 (0.02)
Male 0.48 (0.01) 0.50 (0.01) 0.46 (0.01)
Female 0.52 (0.01) 0.49 (0.01) 0.54 (0.01)
White 0.45 (0.01) 0.56 (0.01) 0.49 (0.02)
Asian 0.48 (0.01) 0.47 (0.02) 0.47 (0.02)
Black 0.54 (0.01) 0.49 (0.02) 0.55 (0.02)
Hispanic 0.52 (0.01) 0.47 (0.02) 0.48 (0.02)
45 0.50 (0.01) 0.49 (0.01) 0.49 (0.02)
43 0.51 (0.01) 0.52 (0.01) 0.51 (0.02)
46 0.49 (0.01) 0.48 (0.01) 0.49 (0.02)
Note: These models are the estimates and standard errors for the binary winner depen-
dent variable by political party of the respondent.
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Table 3.5: Values Dependent Variable By Respondents’ Party
Dem. Rep. Inde.
Straight 0.66 (0.01) 0.69 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01)
Bisexual 0.63 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01) 0.54 (0.01)
Gay 0.65 (0.01) 0.56 (0.01) 0.53 (0.01)
Older children 0.65 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.56 (0.01)
No children 0.63 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.56 (0.01)
Young children 0.65 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01) 0.56 (0.01)
Married 0.65 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
Cohabiting 0.64 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.54 (0.01)
Divorced 0.65 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01) 0.55 (0.01)
Single 0.64 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
City council member 0.63 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.56 (0.01)
Congressional staffer 0.66 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.56 (0.01)
Ironworker 0.65 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01) 0.56 (0.01)
Nurse 0.66 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
Political consultant 0.63 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01) 0.56 (0.01)
Radio talk show host 0.62 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01) 0.54 (0.01)
Male 0.64 (0.00) 0.61 (0.01) 0.55 (0.01)
Female 0.65 (0.00) 0.61 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
White 0.64 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
Asian 0.64 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.54 (0.01)
Black 0.64 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
Hispanic 0.65 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01) 0.56 (0.01)
45 0.65 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.56 (0.01)
43 0.64 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.56 (0.01)
46 0.64 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.56 (0.01)
Note: These models are the estimates and standard errors for the values dependent
variable by political party of the respondent.
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Table 3.6: Govern Dependent Variable By Respondents’ Party
Dem. Rep. Inde.
Straight 0.65 (0.01) 0.68 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
Bisexual 0.63 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
Gay 0.65 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
Older children 0.64 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
No children 0.66 (0.01) 0.66 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01)
Young children 0.62 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.56 (0.01)
Married 0.64 (0.01) 0.64 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
Cohabiting 0.65 (0.01) 0.65 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
Divorced 0.65 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
Single 0.64 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
City council member 0.64 (0.01) 0.65 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01)
Congressional staffer 0.65 (0.01) 0.65 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
Ironworker 0.65 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
Nurse 0.64 (0.01) 0.64 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
Political consultant 0.65 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
Radio talk show host 0.62 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.56 (0.01)
Male 0.64 (0.00) 0.64 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
Female 0.64 (0.00) 0.63 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
White 0.65 (0.01) 0.65 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
Asian 0.64 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
Black 0.64 (0.01) 0.64 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
Hispanic 0.65 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
45 0.65 (0.01) 0.64 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
43 0.64 (0.01) 0.65 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
46 0.64 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
Note: These models are the estimates and standard errors for the govern dependent
variable by political party of the respondent.
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Table 3.7: Ideology Dependent Variable By Respondents’ Party
Dem. Rep. Inde.
Straight 0.59 (0.01) 0.51 (0.01) 0.51 (0.01)
Bisexual 0.65 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01)
Gay 0.67 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01)
Older children 0.63 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
No children 0.64 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
Young children 0.64 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
Married 0.63 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
Cohabiting 0.65 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
Divorced 0.63 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
Single 0.64 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
City council member 0.63 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
Congressional staffer 0.64 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
Ironworker 0.64 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
Nurse 0.63 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
Political consultant 0.64 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
Radio talk show host 0.63 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
Male 0.64 (0.00) 0.58 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
Female 0.64 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
White 0.64 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
Asian 0.64 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
Black 0.64 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
Hispanic 0.64 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
45 0.64 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
43 0.64 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
46 0.63 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
Note: These models are the estimates and standard errors for the ideology dependent
variable by political party of the respondent.
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Table 3.8: Binary & Values Dependent Variables By Respondents’ Gender
Bin. Val.
Men Women Men Women
Straight 0.59 (0.01) 0.55 (0.01) 0.68 (0.01) 0.64 (0.00)
Bisexual 0.48 (0.01) 0.49 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.56 (0.01)
Gay 0.44 (0.01) 0.46 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
Older children 0.51 (0.01) 0.53 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
No children 0.49 (0.01) 0.46 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
Young children 0.50 (0.01) 0.50 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
Married 0.54 (0.01) 0.54 (0.01) 0.64 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
Cohabiting 0.49 (0.01) 0.51 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
Divorced 0.47 (0.01) 0.45 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
Single 0.50 (0.01) 0.49 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
City council member 0.55 (0.02) 0.59 (0.02) 0.64 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
Congressional staffer 0.50 (0.02) 0.52 (0.02) 0.64 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
Ironworker 0.49 (0.02) 0.49 (0.02) 0.64 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
Nurse 0.51 (0.02) 0.53 (0.02) 0.63 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01)
Political consultant 0.52 (0.02) 0.51 (0.02) 0.62 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
Radio talk show host 0.42 (0.02) 0.36 (0.02) 0.60 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
Male 0.50 (0.01) 0.47 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01) 0.59 (0.00)
Female 0.50 (0.01) 0.53 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01) 0.60 (0.00)
White 0.51 (0.01) 0.50 (0.01) 0.64 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
Asian 0.48 (0.01) 0.47 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
Black 0.51 (0.01) 0.54 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
Hispanic 0.50 (0.01) 0.49 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
45 0.50 (0.01) 0.49 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
43 0.51 (0.01) 0.52 (0.01) 0.64 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
46 0.49 (0.01) 0.49 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
Note: These models are the estimates and standard errors for the binary and values dependent variables by
gender of the respondent.
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Table 3.9: Govern & Ideology Dependent Variables By Respondents’ Gender
Gov. Ideo.
Men Women Men Women
Straight 0.66 (0.01) 0.64 (0.00) 0.56 (0.01) 0.53 (0.00)
Bisexual 0.62 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01)
Gay 0.61 (0.01) 0.61 (0.00) 0.64 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01)
Older children 0.62 (0.01) 0.62 (0.00) 0.61 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
No children 0.65 (0.01) 0.65 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
Young children 0.62 (0.01) 0.59 (0.00) 0.61 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
Married 0.64 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01) 0.58 (0.01)
Cohabiting 0.63 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01)
Divorced 0.62 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
Single 0.63 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
City council member 0.64 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
Congressional staffer 0.65 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
Ironworker 0.63 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
Nurse 0.63 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
Political consultant 0.64 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
Radio talk show host 0.61 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
Male 0.64 (0.00) 0.62 (0.00) 0.61 (0.00) 0.59 (0.00)
Female 0.63 (0.00) 0.62 (0.00) 0.61 (0.01) 0.60 (0.00)
White 0.64 (0.01) 0.63 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
Asian 0.63 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
Black 0.63 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
Hispanic 0.62 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
45 0.63 (0.01) 0.62 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01)
43 0.64 (0.01) 0.62 (0.00) 0.61 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
46 0.62 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01)
Note: These models are the estimates and standard errors for the govern and ideology dependent variables

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Older children 0.52 (0.01)
No children 0.48 (0.01)
Young children 0.50 (0.01)
City council member 0.57 (0.01)
Congressional staffer 0.51 (0.01)
Ironworker 0.49 (0.01)
Nurse 0.52 (0.01)
Political consultant 0.52 (0.01)






Married * White 0.54 (0.02)
Cohabiting * White 0.51 (0.02)
Divorced * White 0.46 (0.02)
Single * White 0.50 (0.02)
Married * Asian 0.53 (0.02)
Cohabiting * Asian 0.46 (0.02)
Divorced * Asian 0.45 (0.02)
Single * Asian 0.46 (0.02)
Married * Black 0.57 (0.02)
Cohabiting * Black 0.54 (0.02)
Divorced * Black 0.48 (0.02)
Single * Black 0.51 (0.02)
Married * Hispanic 0.52 (0.02)
Cohabiting * Hispanic 0.49 (0.02)
Divorced * Hispanic 0.45 (0.02)
Single * Hispanic 0.51 (0.02)
Note: These models are the estimates and stan-
dard errors for the binary dependent variable
with an interaction term between relationship
status and race/ethnicity.
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City council member 0.57 (0.01)
Congressional staffer 0.51 (0.01)
Ironworker 0.49 (0.01)
Nurse 0.52 (0.01)
Political consultant 0.52 (0.01)






Older children * White 0.52 (0.02)
No children * White 0.48 (0.02)
Young children * White 0.51 (0.02)
Older children * Asian 0.50 (0.02)
No children * Asian 0.45 (0.02)
Young children * Asian 0.48 (0.02)
Older children * Black 0.55 (0.02)
No children * Black 0.48 (0.02)
Young children * Black 0.55 (0.02)
Older children * Hispanic 0.52 (0.02)
No children * Hispanic 0.50 (0.02)
Young children * Hispanic 0.46 (0.02)
Note: These models are the estimates and stan-
dard errors for the binary dependent variable with
an interaction term between parental status and
race/ethnicity.
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City council member 0.57 (0.01)
Congressional staffer 0.51 (0.01)
Ironworker 0.49 (0.01)
Nurse 0.52 (0.01)
Political consultant 0.52 (0.01)








Older children * Man 0.50 (0.01)
No children * Man 0.46 (0.01)
Young children * Man 0.49 (0.01)
Older children * Woman 0.55 (0.01)
No children * Woman 0.49 (0.01)
Young children * Woman 0.51 (0.01)
Note: These models are the estimates and standard
errors for the binary dependent variable with an in-
teraction term between parental status and gender.
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Table 3.15: Binary Dependent Variable with Interaction Between Sexuality & Gender
Binary
City council member 0.57 (0.01)
Congressional staffer 0.51 (0.01)
Ironworker 0.49 (0.01)
Nurse 0.52 (0.01)
Political consultant 0.52 (0.01)








Older children 0.52 (0.01)
No children 0.48 (0.01)





Straight * Male 0.55 (0.01)
Bisexual * Male 0.47 (0.01)
Gay * Male 0.43 (0.01)
Straight * Female 0.58 (0.01)
Bisexual * Female 0.50 (0.01)
Gay * Female 0.47 (0.01)
Note: These models are the estimates and stan-
dard errors for the binary dependent variable




When Gender Matters: Using Bayesian
Scaling to Examine Gender and Voting
Behavior in a Polarizing Congress
4.1 Introduction
Following dozens of failed attempts to repeal the Affordable Care Act, Republican vic-
tories in the 2016 election gave the GOP their best opportunity yet to quash President
Obama’s signature legislation. However, GOP Senators Lisa Murkowski and Susan Collins,
alongside John McCain, cut short Republicans’ efforts to repeal Obamacare. The media
labeled these women senators as “moderates” within the Republican Party and were cred-
ited with “saving” Obamacare (Cassidy 2017, Parlapiano, Andrews, Lee & Shorey 2017).
This anecdote fits within the conventional wisdom in political science, as well as the popular
media, that women in Congress are more liberal than their male colleagues, and that this
trend is mostly driven by GOP women who are more liberal than their male co-partisans,
especially on women’s issues (Carey, Niemi & Powell 1998, Frederick 2009).
This project re-evaluates this phenomenon by adopting new methodological approaches
to analyze congressional voting, as well as looking at how this trend has varied over time.
Much of the current literature on gender and roll call voting in Congress has used DW-
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NOMINATE or women’s interest group scores as the measure of ideology to compare men
and women lawmakers, both of which have their limitations. DW-NOMINATE, which uses
all votes to construct a member’s ideology score, is an aggregate measure that may conceal
gender differences because women lawmakers may vote differently than men on some policy
issues and not on others (Crespin & Rohde 2010, Roberts, Smith & Haptonstahl 2016). As for
interest group scores, these measures tend to only use a tiny number of votes to construct
members’ scores and tend to reflect the partisan biases of the organization crafting the
measure (Binder, Lawrence & Maltzman 1999). To address the limitations of past measures
of ideology in examining gender differences in Congress, I use Bayesian item response theory
on roll call votes to scale legislators on 21 policy topics. This method improves upon interest
group scores because it allows for a larger number of votes to be examined and does not pick
and choose which votes to include or not. Additionally, this method can offer new insights
obscured by DW-NOMINATE by taking into consideration possible policy topic differences.
A second limitation of the past literature on women legislators’ vote records has been
this research often only examines a short period of time. This project seeks to place a strong
emphasis on the role of time and how polarization has effected legislative behavior. Due
to changing dynamics in Congress and increased polarization, I expect that the influence of
gender is not consistent across time or political parties. I expect there are two factors driving
these temporal changes. First, I theorize that more moderate women have exited Congress
and newly elected women tend to be more ideologically extreme than their predecessors.
Secondly, I expect that increasingly the majority party controls the agenda, such that policies
that do reach a floor vote increasingly divide legislators along partisan lines rather than
gender.
To examine these expectations, this project uses U.S. House roll call data from 1975 to
2016. After generating ideal point estimates for all members of Congress by policy topic
across this time period, I find significant differences across party, issue area, and time. I find
House Republican women had significantly more liberal voting records than Republican men
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in the 1980s and early 1990s, especially on traditionally defined women’s issues; however,
in 1995, when Newt Gingrich took over as speaker marks a significant shift in Republican
women’s voting behavior. Republican women have polarized since that time, such that no
significant gender differences persist in voting behavior among House Republicans in the
2010s, even on women’s issues.
For House Democrats, significant gender differences did not surface until the mid-1990s.
Democratic women did not appear to vote differently from their male co-partisans until
after the 1992 “Year of the Woman,” which was a record-breaking year for women elected to
Congress. Following 1992, Democratic women were significantly more liberal than their male
colleagues, most notably on women’s issues, continuing into the early 2010s. Despite more
homogeneity within parties in recent years, I find Democratic women continue to vote slightly
more liberal than Democratic men on some policy topics, including energy and science.
This project highlights that polarization has disproportionately impacted Republican
women, who over the past several decades have grown more conservative and are more
in-line ideologically with their male colleagues, and that Democratic women remain more
polarized than their male co-partisans. This counters the popular narratives that Republican
women politicians are moderates and Republican men are the most conservative lawmakers.
Additionally, these findings suggest that even women’s issues, where gender identity would
be expected to play a stronger role in shaping legislative behavior, have not been immune
from the effects of polarization. Collectively, this project combines past research on gender
and politics, agenda setting, and polarization to understand the changing effects of gender
on congressional roll call voting.
4.2 Women in Congress
As the first woman elected to Congress in 1916, Jeannette Rankin used her legislative
power to prioritize and address women’s issues, including introducing legislation to give
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women the right to vote. In the years since Rankin’s election, scholars have examined how
women differ in their legislative behavior from their men colleagues, especially in addressing
and bringing attention to women’s issues. As visualized in Figure 4.1, the number of women
in Congress has slowly and steady increased over time, more strongly driven by an increase
in Democratic women elected to Congress.
Early research on the effect of gender on legislative behavior did find significant differ-
ences. For example, women in the House in the 1960s and 1970s consistently voted more
liberal than their male colleagues (Frankovic 1977, Welch 1985). Looking at roll call voting
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a legislator’s gender is significantly related to various
interest group scores, and this effect was strongest among GOP women on women’s issues
(Dolan 1998a, Norton 1999, Swers 1998). Other research on this time finds women lawmak-
ers vote differently on other types of policy issues, including women being more likely to vote

































































Figure 4.1: Women in the U.S. House of Representatives
Note: Data from Brookings “Vital Statistics on Congress.” https://www.brookings.edu/multi-
chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/
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More recent research on gender differences in Congress finds no gender effect on voting
behavior or finds a gender effect is limited to only Republican women senators voting more
liberal than Republican men (Evans 2005, Frederick 2009, 2010, 2013). Even looking at
specific policy topics, such as military issues, evidence suggests women do not differ from
their male colleagues (Bendix & Jeong 2020). Similar research on state legislatures finds
that women are more liberal than men on social issues and women’s issues (Carey, Niemi &
Powell 1998, Jenkins 2012, Thomas 1994). A comprehensive analysis of state legislators from
1999 to 2014 finds that women of both parties are not more liberal, but rather women are
more polarized than their men co-partisans, such that Democratic women are more liberal
than Democratic men and Republican women are more conservative than Republican men
(Osborn, Kreitzer, Schilling & Hayes Clark 2019).1 Furthermore, cross-national research
on right wing parties finds women candidates tend to be more liberal overall than men
candidates (de Geus & Shorrocks 2020).
Beyond voting, scholars have noted how women differ in terms of other legislative
behavior. When interviewed, women in Congress often express they feel their presence
makes a difference, as they offer a unique perspective as a woman in the legislative pro-
cess (Brown 2014, Dittmar, Sanbonmatsu & Carroll 2018). Women lawmakers are more
likely than men to sponsor legislation on women’s issues (Atkinson 2020, Swers 2013). Fur-
thermore, women lawmakers sponsor more legislation overall and are more successful at
pushing their bills through the process as compared to their male colleagues (Schmitt &
Brant 2019, Volden, Wiseman & Wittmer 2013).
Therefore, if women lawmakers differ from their male colleagues on a variety of legislative
behaviors, it would also be expected they behave differently on floor votes. Or perhaps,
while stages earlier in the legislative process, such as bill sponsorship, offer lawmakers more
freedom in what policies they pursue, the negative agenda control mechanisms at play in
what makes it to the House floor restrict the opportunities for gender differences to arise in
1The evidence is mixed on if the bigger gender difference in state legislatures is within the Democratic or
Republican Party (Osborn 2012, Poggione 2004).
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roll call voting (Cox & McCubbins 2005). Ultimately, past research on the role of gender
identity in understanding congressional voting behavior is mixed, in part because much of
this work is limited in scope, such as examining a single policy topic or gender differences
within a single congress. This paper aims to offer a more comprehensive examination of how
gender identity influences voting behavior by looking at votes across congresses and policy
topics.
4.3 Theoretical Expectations
A robust body of research has examined gender differences in congressional voting records.
This paper seeks to extend this line of research by utilizing new methodological approaches
to examine voting behavior by policy topic, in addition to examining how gender effects have
waxed and waned across time.
Among the public, party identity plays a dominating role in understanding pol-
icy preferences and political behavior; however, gender differences persist (Barnes &
Cassese 2017, Howell & Day 2000, Lizotte 2020). While women are overall more likely
than men to identify as Democrats, gender differences within parties also exist (Kanthak &
Norrander 2003). For example, recent research finds Republican women have more liberal
views on education and health care than GOP men (Barnes & Cassese 2017).
Turning to political elites, models of congressional voting behavior have often been con-
densed down to a single dimension, as partisanship can explain a large majority of voting
decisions (Poole & Rosenthal 1991). With partisanship shaping much of legislative behav-
ior, this leaves limited opportunities for gender differences to arise within parties. How-
ever, there are several reasons to suspect gender identity may influence legislative voting.
First, women legislators articulate that they feel they bring a unique perspective that in-
fluences their policy preferences, especially on issues that disproportionately impact women
(Brown 2014, Dittmar, Sanbonmatsu & Carroll 2018). Their life experiences as women give
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them different insights on issues such as reproductive rights, child care, and family leave
than their male colleagues (Burrell 1994, Rhinehart & Crespin 2020).
Additionally, women have historically had less power in society, shaping how women think
about and value equality. Broadly, women tend to be more altruistic and egalitarian, while
men tend to more highly value individualism (Carroll 1988, Howell & Day 2000, Schlesinger
& Heldman 2001). This leads women to be more supportive of government programs that
promote equality, including expanding the social welfare safety net and policies that extend
rights to disenfranchised groups (Pratto, Stallworth & Sidanius 1997). Furthermore, women,
especially as they have increasingly entered the workforce, are more likely to experience
discrimination, thus leading women to be more supportive of policies that promote equal
opportunity and support historically underprivileged groups (Carroll 1988, Schlesinger &
Heldman 2001).
Overall, I expect because of life experiences and value differences between men and
women, women in Congress are more liberal than their male colleagues. However, I also
expect this difference has fluctuated over time. As political elites have polarized and parties
in Congress have grown more internally homogenous, the dominating role of parties leaving
less room for gender effects in voting behavior. Since the 1970s, polarization in Congress
has surged, and therefore, across all issues, party differences can explain a higher proportion
of voting decisions (Jochim & Jones 2013, McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal 2008). Across both
parties, I except women increasingly vote more similar to their male co-partisans. However,
I except this trend is more notable within the GOP, as the polarization of Congress has
disproportionately been driven by Republicans shifting to the right (Grossmann & Hopkins
2016). In particular, I expect this shift within the GOP, in which women’s voting looks
increasingly more similar to men’s, began with the leadership of Speaker Newt Gingrich.
After 40 years of Democratic rule, Gingrich and the 1994 Republican Revolution earned
the GOP huge gains in the House (Rosenbaum 1994). Gingrich, a self-described transforma-
tional leader, pushed an aggressive agenda that demanded conformity to a more conservative
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ideology focused on limited government and individual liberty (The House Republican plan
for a better America 1995, Sinclair 1999, Strahan 2007). Gingrich wrote in 1989 if the
GOP ever wanted a majority in the House, they needed to coalesce around a “conservative
philosophy” (Personal correspondence 1989).
Following the 1994 election, the new Republican Party House leadership emphasized this
unity. For example, in a 1995 letter to all freshman Republicans, House Majority Leader Dick
Armey (TX) specified, “We have fundamentally changed the image of House Republicans
and we have made great progress toward a better America...Let’s stay solid as a team”
(Correspondence 1995-1996). In a note to all House Republicans later that year, Armey
wrote, “This Congress is truly historical...We ran on a unified program and we kept our
word” (Members’ concerns 1995-2000). Once again stressing the importance of a cohesive
conservative bloc, Armey wrote in a 1996 letter to GOP House members about upcoming
votes, “If we work together in a spirit of unity, we can successfully complete our work for
this Congress” (Correspondence 1995-1996).
Overall, the Republican Party at this time shifted away from seeking bipartisan collabora-
tion on legislation and toward a more adversarial style in pushing their own political agenda
(Theriault 2013). For example, Gingrich cut funding to groups, including the Congressional
Caucus for Women’s Issues, which were dedicated to fostering bipartisan collaborations, as
these groups threatened his ability to promote party unity (Hawkesworth, Casey, Jenkins
& Kleeman 2001). Gingrich further emphasized party unity by violating seniority norms
in assigning committee chairs, and instead appointed chairs who were loyal to him and the
party (Aldrich & Rohde 1997).
As to why polarization has led to the decline of gender differences in roll call voting
behavior, I offer two potential explanations. First, I expect a legislator’s personal ideology
is fairly consistent across their tenure in Congress (Poole 2007). Therefore, I expect much of
the change in how women vote in Congress does not come from individual women changing
their ideologies over time but rather through the replacement of retiring moderate women
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with more ideologically extreme women. Since the last 1970s, Republicans who have entered
Congress have overall been more ideologically extreme than Republicans who served prior
(Theriault 2013). Polarization has also made a career in Congress less appealing to moderate
candidates, as they are less likely to think they can win and less likely to think they can
accomplish policy goals should they be elected (Thomsen 2017). Looking at state legisla-
tors, the most common pipeline to running for Congress, more moderate state legislators
are less likely to seek a congressional run as compared to their more ideologically extreme
colleagues (Thomsen 2017). Therefore, I expect that since the 1990s, women who have left
Congress have tended to be more moderate, while women newly elected to the House are
more ideologically extreme.
Additionally, I expect changes in the composition of the political agenda have led to a
decline in gender differences in roll call voting. While women legislators may be more liberal
on some policies, if these policies are voted on less frequently, it gives the appearance that
Congress is more polarized than it actually is while masking gender effects. It is likely that
issue areas are more multidimensional than roll call outcomes would suggest (Crespin &
Rohde 2010). Starting with Gingrich, speakers were less likely to allow bills to make it to
a floor vote if they expect it would split their party. Following the Republican Revolution,
GOP leadership was more aggressive than their predecessors in controlling the legislative
agenda (Carson, Monroe & Robinson 2011). Since then, House majority party leadership
has been increasingly more successful at controlling what does and does not make a floor
vote (Stiglitz & Weingast 2010).
Therefore, the bills that do reach the floor are more likely to be decided along party
lines, and consequently less likely to split the majority party along another dimension. One
of those dimensions could be gender differences; therefore, the types of bills most likely to
highlight gender differences are increasingly less likely to reach the House floor. Roll call
votes reveal where each legislator stands on a particular policy alternative, but roll call
records cannot reveal the majority party strategies behind what does and does not receive
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a floor vote (Lee 2009). Even on women’s issues, parties have increasingly framed these
policies along different dimensions that are more likely to divide legislators along party lines
rather than gender. For example, health care has traditionally been framed as a caregiving
and women’s issue, but in the past decade has been reframed as an economic issue, leading to
more partisan unity in voting (Hayden 2018). These expectations about women in Congress
and the influence of polarization leads to my first set of expectations.
Hypothesis 1. Within both political parties, women in Congress vote more liberal than their
male co-partisans.
Hypothesis 2. Gender differences in voting behavior have diminished over time. This decline
has been greater within the Republican Party, especially since the 104th Congress.
The importance of studying roll call voting by policy topic is that, theoretically, I expect
women are not more liberal than men on all issues, but rather this effect is greatest on
women’s issues. For example, I do not expect women to vote differently on national park
conservation or highway infrastructure bills, but rather that gender differences are most
prominent on issues such as reproductive rights or legislation advancing gender equality.
I adopt Swers’ (2002) definition of women’s issues as those that, “are particularly salient
to women because they seek to achieve equality for women; they address women’s special
needs, such as women’s health concerns or child care issues; or they confront issues with which
women have traditionally been concerned in their role as caregivers, such as education, health
care, or the protection of children.” Therefore, because women are more likely to prioritize
women’s issues and offer a unique perspective on these policies, I expect these issues to be
when gender differences are most prominent.
Hypothesis 3. Within both political parties, women in Congress vote more liberal than their
male co-partisans on women’s issues. This effect has diminished over time.
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4.4 Data & Methods
Prevalent in research on gender and Congress is the use of the annual score produced by
the American Association of University Women (AAUW). The AAUW is an interest group
dedicated to advocating for women, and each congress they score lawmakers based on how
they voted on the organization’s policy priorities. For example, scores in the 112th Congress
included votes on the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act and the Paycheck Fair-
ness Act. However, a shortcoming of using AAUW scores is this measure uses so few votes.
For example, scores in the 103rd Congress were based on six bills. While this score provides
a look at specific types of bills, it is limited in providing a broader understanding of voting
behavior as legislators voted on more than 1,000 bills in the 103rd Congress.2
Another concern with using interest group scores is introducing bias based on the partisan
motivations of the organizations creating these scores. The political agenda and policy goals
of a given interest group often more closely align with one party over the other. Thus, in
creating these scores, these organizations have a partisan motivation in picking which votes
they decide to include in their scorecard, likely picking hot-button legislation that sharply
divides the parties (Binder, Lawrence & Maltzman 1999). Additionally, in looking at the
distribution of most interest group scores, they tend to be bimodal, assigning most lawmakers
an ideologically extreme score and few a moderate score (Jeong 2018, Snyder Jr 1992).
Therefore, these measures tend to exaggerate the true distribution of members’ preferences.
While interest groups use too few votes to understand the complexity of legislators’
preferences, DW-NOMINATE scores fall on the opposite extreme. DW-NOMINATE scores,
which utilize scaling methods on all votes to craft members’ scores, are a widely-used measure
in congressional research. This method produces a parsimonious model that explains a
majority of voting behavior (Poole & Rosenthal 1991, 1997). While DW-NOMINATE scores
suggest that voting is one-dimensional, a drawback of using this measure for my specific
2Other women’s interest group scores that have been used by researchers include those from the National
Organization of Women and the National Right to Life Committee, both of which also use a similar small
number of votes to construct members’ scores.
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research question is that members are often not ideologically consistent across different policy
topics (Crespin & Rohde 2010, Hurwitz, Moiles & Rohde 2001). A legislator could vote
extremely conservative on one issue area but more moderate on others. For example, in
Figure 4.2, I plot three ideology scores for Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) in the 114th
Congress. Ros-Lehtinen has a 0.88 ideology score for voting on international affairs issues,
making her a more conservative member in the House, a 0.4 ideology score for foreign trade
bills, placing her around the median of Republicans, and an ideology score of -0.05 for
environment issues, making her much more moderate on this issue than her GOP colleagues.
This example highlights that aggregate scores, such as DW-NOMINATE, may mask the
true dimensionality of members’ preferences (Aldrich, Montgomery & Sparks 2014, Roberts,
Smith & Haptonstahl 2016).
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Figure 4.2: Ideological Inconsistency: Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) in the
114th Congress
Note: This figure highlights an example of a legislator who is not ideologically consistent across
policy topics, which leads me to use policy specific ideological scores for this analysis rather than
DW-NOMINATE.
To address the shortcomings of using either interest group scores or DW-NOMINATE to
examine gender differences in Congress, I use Bayesian item response theory (IRT) to scale
members by policy topic.3 Bayesian IRT assumes that lawmakers have policy preferences,
and that they act in a way to maximize their utility (Riker & Ordeshook 1973). Members vote
in favor of legislation if the proposed policy is closer to their ideal policy than the status
3While Bayesian IRT was originally developed for education research, it has been adopted to roll call
votes to scale members of Congress (Clinton, Jackman & Rivers 2004).
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quo and vote against the bill if the status quo is closer to their ideal point. While DW-
NOMINATE and Bayesian IRT tend to produce similar ideal point estimates for legislators,
Bayesian IRT offers several advantages over DW-NOMINATE (Carroll, Lewis, Lo, Poole &
Rosenthal 2009). First, while the DW-NOMINATE process is computationally intensive,
the Bayesian approach simplifies the process using a routine Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) simulation (Clinton, Jackman & Rivers 2004).4 Furthermore, Bayesian IRT allows
for the incorporation of data points that are traditionally excluded from DW-NOMINATE,
including lopsided votes and legislators with short voting records, improving the estimates
of members’ ideal points (Clinton, Jackman & Rivers 2004). Finally, Bayesian IRT is better
able to scale members when few roll call votes are available, which is important for this
project because for some policy topics, there are a limited number of votes per congress.
In addition to using Bayesian IRT, another methodological decision to better address my
hypotheses and to gauge gender differences in Congress is to scale members by policy topic
rather than across all votes. This approach is useful for my research question because I expect
gender differences to be greater on women’s issue and for there to be limited to no gender
differences on other issue areas. Therefore, if I used DW-NOMINATE, it may camouflage
gender differences in voting behavior. While interest group scores tend to be centered around
a single policy topic, these scores only incorporate a handful of votes. Bayesian IRT allows
me to incorporate all votes on a given policy topic to estimate a lawmakers’ policy-specific
ideal point. This is a less biased estimate, as it does not pick and choose which votes are
included.
To define policy topics, I use the Policy Agendas Project, which codes all bills into one of
20 major topics and 220 subtopics.5 For this project, I scale members on all votes in addition
to by each of these 20 major policy topics.6 Therefore, each legislator has an ideal point
4Bayesian IRT assumes a quadratic utility function for legislators, and errors are assumed to follow a
normal distribution (Clinton, Jackman & Rivers 2004).
5Roll Call Votes, The Policy Agendas Project at the University of Texas at Austin (accessed October 10,
2019).
6I use the pscl package in R to scale members. For the Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation, 10,000
iterations were run, with a burnin of 500 and the thinning interval set at 100. See Appendix Figure 4.14
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for each policy topic for each term they served in Congress. Lawmakers’ ideal points are
normalized, with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Keeping in the same tradition as
DW-NOMINATE, negative scores are more liberal and positive scores are more conservative.
Although Bayesian IRT can better handle a small number of votes than can the DW-
NOMINATE, using ideal points based on too few votes produces large credible intervals and
limits the ability to feel confident in the conclusions I draw from this analysis. This is a
challenge for this project because often within a single session of Congress, there may not be
many votes on a specific policy topic. To determine the cutoff for the minimum number of
votes for a policy topic to be included in this analysis, I look to the AAUW interest groups
scores. By using the average number of votes included in the AAUW scores as my minimum
cutoff, this means my ideal points are providing at least as much information as these interest
group scores. The average number of votes used to create these scores across the same years
used in this analysis is 8.5 votes; therefore, I decide to exclude from my analysis any policy
topic in a single session of Congress that has less than nine votes.7 After excluding these
policy topics, the mean and median number of votes used to scale per congress is 56 and 37,
respectively.8
This project is also specifically interested in how women lawmakers may differ from
men on women’s issues. Looking at the 20 major policy topics, I identify four which I
operationalize as women’s issues – civil rights, education, health, and social welfare. Past
research finds men are perceived as better able to address the economy, foreign affairs, crime,
and terrorism; however, women are stereotyped as better to handle poverty, children, social
welfare, health care, and education (Bauer 2020, Bracic et al. 2020, Huddy & Terkildsen
1993, Schneider 2014). Volden, Wiseman, Wittmer (2018) define women’s issues as those
in which women legislators sponsor bills at a greater rate, which they find includes civil
for how my measures correlate with DW-NOMINATE. My ideology scores on all votes correlates with DW-
NOMINATE 0.94.
7Based on the nine votes threshold, I exclude 18 policy topics in a single Congress from this analysis, as
well as four congresses on women’s issues.
8See Appendix Figure 4.13 for the distribution of number of votes used by policy topic.
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rights, education, and health. Therefore, based on how past research has define women’s
issues, I select these four policy topics as women’s issues and those for which I expect gender
differences to be greatest.
In addition to these four major policy topics, I identify five of the coded subtopics that are
exclusively women’s issues. These five subtopics are gender and sexual orientation discrimi-
nation, infants and children, parental leave and child care, child abuse and child pornography,
and family issues. While there is no clear definition of what constitutes a women’s issue,
these issues fit within how past scholars have strived to outline women’s issues, including
Swers’ (2002) definition outlined above. I combine these five subtopics and scale members
to give each an ideal point on my measure of women’s issues.
This analysis runs from the 94th Congress (1975-76) to the 114th Congress (2015-16).9
The 94th Congress was selected as the start year for two reasons. Before this time, there
were not many women in Congress to study. Secondly, several rules changes in the House,
including voting by electronic device and recorded voting in the Committee of the Whole,
occurred in the early 1970s, making comparison of voting before and after this period chal-
lenging (Roberts & Smith 2003). My dependent variable is my measure of ideology by policy
topic, by Congress. Because this is a continuous variable, I run OLS regression. The main
independent variables of interest are the party and gender of the lawmaker. Therefore, I
construct a 4-level factored variable that labels Republican women, Republican men, Demo-
cratic women, and Democratic men.10 I incorporate a number of other covariates into my
models that I expect impact members’ voting behavior.11 Vote share is measured as the
percent of the vote the legislator received in their most recent election. Several binary vari-
9Roll call data was collected from Lewis, Poole, Rosenthal, Boche, Rudkin, & Sonnet 2019 (accessed
August 27, 2019). Additional variables on roll call votes were collected from Crespin & Rohde 2019 (accessed
October 8, 2019).
10I change the reference category depending on if I am comparing Republican women and Republican men
versus comparing Democratic women and Democratic men. Throughout the paper, all analysis is presented
as comparing women and men within parties. I do not examine gender effects across both parties because
historically, the number of Democratic women in Congress has swamps the number of Republican women,
so any analysis on Congress has a whole would just be picking up the liberal-leanings of Democratic women.
11Several of these variables were provided by Volden & Wiseman 2014 (accessed September 10, 2019).
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ables are incorporated, labeling if the lawmaker is Black or Latinx, as well as if the legislator
represented a state from the South.12 Seniority is a measure of the total number of terms a
member has served in Congress. Congressional leadership often votes differently than rank-
and-file members, so I include binary variables for majority party leadership, minority party
leadership, and those that chair a committee. As general measures of district demand for
certain types of policies, I include several common measures used in past research from the
U.S. Census to measure district differences (e.g. Frederick 2010, Swers 1998). I include three
measures — percent urban, median household income, and percent Black.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































● ● ● ●Democratic Men Democratic Women Republican Men Republican Women
Figure 4.3: House Mean Ideal Points By Policy Topic
Note: For these ideal points, positive numbers are more conservative and negative numbers are more
liberal. For ease of interpretation, these measures are standardized, such that each has a mean of 0 and
a standard deviation of 1. The policy topics shaded in gray are the four which I have operationalized
as women’s issues.
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As an initial look at the data, Figure 4.3 displays the average ideal point by policy topic,
as well as all votes, for four groups in the U.S. House of Representatives – Democratic men,
Democratic women, Republican men, and Republican women. First, the most obvious trend
that stands out is that partisanship consistently matters significantly in understanding voting
behavior from the 1970s to now. Across nearly all policy topics and all congresses, men and
women of the same party vote more similar than do all women or all men across partisan
lines. There are a few exceptions to this, for example Republican women appear more closely
aligned with Democrats than Republican men on civil rights in the 97th Congress, but these
outliers are rare.
For Republicans, Figure 4.3 seems to offer some initial support for my expectation that
since the 104th Congress (1995-96), when Gingrich took over the speakership, gender dif-
ferences appear to have diminished. This shift has been so stark that in the most recent
congresses, there appears few voting differences between Republican women and men on
most issues. Voting on environmental issues is a good example of this trend, as it appears
Republican women in the 1970s and 1980s voted more liberal than GOP men, but the 104th
Congress marks a clear shift toward less divergence between men and women.
Looking at House Democrats, there are overall fewer gender differences across time than
within the GOP. For example, looking at voting on labor legislation across 40 years, Demo-
cratic men and women appears to vote very similarly. Democratic women appear slightly
more liberal than Democratic men on some policy topics in the 1990s and 2000s. For example,
since the 103rd Congress (1993-94) and into the 2000s, Democratic women appear more lib-
eral than Democratic men on civil rights and crime. However, in the most recent congresses,
there appears few gender differences among Democrats. Overall, Figure 4.3 highlights that
gender differences have fluctuated over time, and that polarization, especially within the past
decade, has played a role in diminishing the influence of gender identity on congressional




















































































● ● ● ●Democratic Men Democratic Women Republican Men Republican Women
Figure 4.4: House Mean Ideal Points on Women’s Issues
Note: For these ideal points, positive numbers are more conservative and negative numbers are more
liberal. This measure of women’s issues is a combination of voting on gender and sexual orientation
discrimination, infants and children, parental leave and child care, child abuse and child pornography,
and family issues.
Figure 4.4 compares men and women of both parties on women’s issues, using my measure
constructed by scaling roll call voting on five policy subtopics. In this figure, Republican
women stand out as the most interesting trend across time. On average, Republican women
in the 1970s and 1980s appear more liberal on women’s issues than Republican men but shift
toward more conservative voting in the 1990s. For example, in the 98th Congress, Republican
women voted as liberal as Democratic men on women’s issues. However, since that time,
GOP women have slowly grown more conservative. Since the 110th Congress, Republican
women appear identical to GOP men in voting on women’s issues. Across time, Republican
men appear rather consistent in voting on women’s issues, and it has been Republican
women that have shifted toward voting more conservative and more in-line with their male
colleagues. Because I expect women’s issues are going to be when gender differences are
most apparent, this seems to offer little evidence of gender differences within the Republican
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Party persisting into the 2010s.
Among Democrats on women’s issues, there are fluctuations in gender differences over
time, but the 103rd Congress, the first session after the 1992 “Year of the Woman” appears
to mark a more liberal shift in how Democratic women voted. Similar to Republicans, I find
Democratic women and men have grown more similar in how they vote on women’s issues
since the 1990s; however, Democratic women have not been the sole drivers of this shift.
For example, it appears since the 1990s, Democratic men have on average moved slightly
more liberal on women’s issues. In the 2010s, Democratic men and women appear to vote
similarly on women’s issues.
As a more stringent test of my theoretical expectations, I run regression models with
my ideology scores as the dependent variable and the independent variables outlined above.
I run a model by policy topic for each session of Congress, in addition to a model for all
votes and women’s issues. This gives me a total of 462 models (21 sessions of Congress
x 22 policy topics). To simplify my results, in Figures 4.5-4.10, I plot the coefficient and
confidence interval for my variable of interest – the factored variable of the legislator’s gender
and party. Because I am primarily interested in within party gender differences, Figures 4.5,
4.6, and 4.7 present the coefficients for Republican women as compared to Republican men
and Figures 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 present the coefficients for Democratic women as compared to
Democratic men. In these figures, the dot represents the coefficient and the line visualizes
the 95% confidence interval. For ease of interpretation, all coefficients that are statistically
significant (p<0.05) are bolded.
Turning first to the results for Republican women, I find interesting patterns across time.
In the late 1970s (94th-96th congresses), I find few significant gender differences, although
most policy topic coefficients are in the negative direction, meaning women tended to be
more liberal. The lack of findings in the 1970s is likely a result of the shortage of Republican
women in the House at the time.13 Therefore, I cannot draw strong conclusions on GOP
13For example, in the 94-96th congresses (1975-1980), there were only five Republican women in the House.
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gender differences in the 1970s. However, in the 1980s, there is an increase of Republican
women in the House, and with this comes significant gender differences in voting behavior.
In support of hypotheses 1 and 3, I find the peak of Republican gender differences appears to
be in the 101st-103rd congresses (1987-1994), in which Republican women voted more liberal
than their male colleagues on several policy topics, including on women’s issues. For the four
major policy topics I operationalize as women’s issues – civil rights, health, education, and
social welfare – in the 101st-103rd congresses, Republican women are on average 0.46 more
moderate than Republican men.
However, as outlined in hypothesis 2, it is in the mid-1990s when Gingrich took over
the speakership, that there is a drop in gender differences in the GOP. For example, in
the 103rd Congress (1993-94), right before the Republican Revolution, Republican women
legislators were significantly more liberal across 13 policy topics; however, in the following
congress, when Gingrich was in charge, Republican women only voted significantly more
liberal on three policy topics. Therefore, this shift was not restricted to women’s issues but
was across a wide variety of policy areas. Before the 104th Congress, Republican women
were significantly more liberal than Republican men on the four major women’s issues 42%
of the time, but in the 104th and beyond, women were only significantly different 24% of the
time. Therefore, it appears women’s issues were not immune from these polarizing effects.
Since the mid-1990s, Republican women in the House have become increasingly more
in line ideologically with their male colleagues. This trend continued into the 2000s and
2010s, such that Republican women look nearly indistinguishable from GOP men. In the
most recent congresses, while not statistically significant, Republican women appear to be
moving more conservative than their male colleagues on some policy topics, including civil
rights, labor, and defense. These results highlight a serious shift for Republican women in
the House, such that in the 1980s and early 1990s Republican women were more liberal than
their male co-partisans, but due to the asymmetric polarization of the GOP, Republican
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.7: House Republican women vs. Republican men (Policy Topics 17:22)
Note: These figures plot the coefficient and 95% confidence interval for the factored variable Republican
women as compared to Republican men. Each coefficient is estimated from a separate OLS regression
model. For ease of interpretation, all statistically significant estimates (p<0.05) are bolded. If the
95% confidence interval crosses the dotted vertical line, the estimate is not statistically significant. If
the 95% confidence interval does not cross the dotted vertical line and is to the left of the line, this
means for that policy topic, in that Congress, Republican women voted significantly more liberal than
Republican men. Control variables included in all models are vote share, Black, Latino, South, se-
niority, majority party leadership, minority party leadership, committee chair, district percent urban,
district median household income, and district percent Black.
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These findings also support the notion that much of the change in the Republican Party
came after Gingrich took over as Speaker and promoted a more unified conservative ideology
in Congress.
Beyond looking at how House Republican women have changed over time, I am also
interested in how gender differences may be greater on some policy topics than others. In
support of hypothesis 3, I find Republican women are most often different from their male
colleagues on my measure of women’s issues, as well as civil rights. However, other policy
topics that I had defined as women’s issues, including education, health, and social welfare,
do not appear to stand out as compared to other policy topics in highlighting Republican
women voting significantly more liberal. Therefore, the stereotype that women are more
liberal on these issues does not seem to hold up for Republican women. I find the fewest
gender differences within voting on labor, finance, trade, and government operations, which
makes sense as I would not expect gender identity to be a dominating influence in voting for
these types of policies.
Figures 4.8-4.10 highlight the role of gender in understanding voting within the Demo-
cratic Party. These results differ from findings on House Republicans both across time and
by policy topic. For Democratic women, I find few significant differences in their voting be-
havior from Democratic men in the late 1970s and into the 1980s, whereas for Republicans,
the 1980s were a significant period where GOP women were voting more liberal. However, it
is in the mid-1990s, when gender differences are diminishing with the Republican Party, that
there is a spike in gender differences within the Democratic Party. It is in the 103th Congress
(1993-94), the first session after the 1992 “Year of the Woman,” when Democratic women
appear to shift toward voting more liberal than Democratic men, in support of hypothesis
1.
Past the mid-1990s, I find that gender differences within the Democratic Party persist
into the 2000s and early 2010s. In the most recent years in this data, the voting behavior of
Democratic women appears to have shifted a bit more in line with Democratic men, similar
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to how Republican women have, yet they remain significantly more liberal on several policy
topics, including agriculture, energy, and science. Unsurprisingly, I find that one of the policy
topics where Democratic women often vote more liberal than Democratic men is women’s
issues; however, I find that other policy topics where I expected Democratic women to vote
more liberal on, including education, health, social welfare, and civil rights, do not stand
out as compared to other policy topics as votes where women tend to differ significantly
from their male colleagues. Surprisingly, I find Democratic women often vote more liberal
on agriculture and energy bills. Across all congresses, the policy topics that demonstrate the
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.10: House Democratic women vs. Democratic men (Policy Topics
17:22)
Note: These figures plot the coefficient and 95% confidence interval for the factored variable Demo-
cratic women as compared to Democratic men. Each coefficient is estimated from a separate OLS
regression model. For ease of interpretation, all statistically significant estimates (p<0.05) are bolded.
If the 95% confidence interval crosses the dotted vertical line, the estimate is not statistically signif-
icant. If the 95% confidence interval does not cross the dotted vertical line and is to the left of the
line, this means for that policy topic, in that Congress, Democratic women voted significantly more
liberal than Democratic men. Control variables included in all models are vote share, Black, Latino,
South, seniority, majority party leadership, minority party leadership, committee chair, district per-
cent urban, district median household income, and district percent Black.
139
Overall, the results for House Democrats highlight that while polarization has clearly
dampened gender differences within the GOP, such that Republican women have grown more
conservative over time, gender identity continues to play an important role in understand
the voting behavior of Democrats. Democratic women remain slightly more polarized than
their male co-partisans. Additionally, for Republicans, I find most often gender differences
are concentrated to women’s issues, but for Democrats, gender differences appear to cover a
wider variety of policy topics.
4.5.1 Explanation: Is it Replacement?
In my theory, I outline two potential factors at play that help explain how gender differ-
ences in Congress have changed over time. First, I expect more ideologically extreme women
have replaced moderate women retirees. Second, I theorize the changing political agenda has
shifted toward roll call votes that highlight partisan divides rather than gender differences.
To better understand why gender differences changed so dramatically within the Republi-
can Party between the 103rd and 104th congresses, I look more closely at the data to explain
this shift. First, from the 103rd to the 104th congresses, there were only two GOP women
who either retired or ran for higher office. Swept in as part of the 1994 Republican Revolution
were seven new Republican women in the House, who appear to offer the best explanation
for this shift. Using a t-test to examine differences in voting behavior in the 104th Congress
between returning Republican women and those newly elected, I find a significant difference
between the two on all votes (p<0.05). In the 104th Congress, the average ideology score on
all votes for Republican women who had previously served in the House was 0.53, and the
average for newly elected GOP women was 1.02, meaning the new women were much more
conservative than previous women who had served. This seems consistent with anecdotal
stories of the women who won in 1994. For example, Andrea Seastrand of California was
first elected in 1994 and was dubbed a “Newt clone” who was publically supportive of the
goals of the Contract with America (Ayres Jr. 1996). Her opponent in her 1996 reelection
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campaign even attacked her as a legislator who could not think independently from Gingrich.
This explanation also fits with research which finds since the 1990s, moderate Republican
women are significantly less likely to run for Congress as compared to more ideologically








































































● ● ●New Republicans Retiring Republicans Returning Republicans
Figure 4.11: Average Ideology of New, Retiring, and Returning Republican
Women
This figure plots the average ideology on all votes by Congress for freshman Republican women,
returning Republican women, and Republican women leaving at the end of the congress due to retiring,
losing reelection, or running for higher office.
In Figure 4.11, I plot the average ideology score on all votes for Republican women in each
Congress. This figure starts in the 103rd Congress, when gender differences appear to start
shifting. Looking at Republican women in each congress, I plot the average ideology score
for freshman, non-freshman, and those serving their last term in the House, due to either
retirement, losing reelection, or running for higher office. I find that overall, across the 1990s
and 2000s, freshman Republican women tended to be more conservative than Republican
women who had previously served. In 7 out of the 12 congresses plotted, freshman Republican
women are more conservative than both returning and retiring GOP women. Thus, Figure
4.11 seems to offer some evidence that the replacement of more moderate Republican women
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with more conservative Republican women is part of the story in understanding why this
polarization of Republican women in the House has occurred.
To examine how replacement might have played a role in the Democratic Party, I look to
changes around 1992. This year was record-breaking for the number of Democratic women
who ran for and won seats in Congress. Many of the women who ran in 1992 said they were
inspired to run because of the saliency of women’s issues at the time, in part due to Anita
Hill’s testimony before an all-male congressional committee bringing forward allegations of
sexual harassment against Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas. Women’s issues were
also at the political forefront due to several Supreme Court decisions on abortion access,
political debate surrounding the adoption of parental leave policies, and an election that
emphasized traditional women’s issues including education and health care (Dolan 1998b).
Looking at historical accounts of the 103rd Congress and trends in my data, it appears,
the momentum for women in politics from the 1992 election carried into the 103rd Congress,
resulting in an increase of women’s issues legislation being considered and women of both
parties working together to pass progressive women’s issue bills (Dolan 1998a). Between the
102nd and 103rd congresses, Democratic women did not shift to voting more liberally than
Democratic men on all policy topics, but rather, this shift was concentrated around women’s
issues, including civil rights, health, education, and my own defined subset of women’s
issues. For these four policy topics, Democratic women did not vote significantly different
than Democratic men in the 102nd Congress but did vote significantly more liberal than
Democratic men in the 103rd Congress, after the “Year of the Woman.”
There are a couple possible explanations for why the 103rd Congress stands out as a
critical deviation in how Democratic women voted. First, it could be that Democratic
women who served in the 102nd House and chose to retire were more moderate than the
women who chose to run for reelection. Between the 102nd and 103rd congresses, there
were five women who decided to either retire or run for higher office, and I do find that
these five women tended to overall be more moderate than those who decided to stay in
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the House, especially on women’s issues. For example, for my definition of women’s issues,
the average ideology score for the retiring women in the 102nd Congress was -0.42 while
the average for women who did not retire was -0.85. Therefore, I find some evidence that
retirements played a difference in understanding why the 103rd Congress marked a shifted
in Democratic women’s voting behavior. A second explanation could be that the women
elected in the “Year of the Woman” were more liberal than women who had previously
served. There were 20 new Democratic women in the 103rd Congress. Looking at ideology
scores differences, particularly on women’s issues, between Democratic incumbent women
and freshman women in the 103rd Congress, I find these new women were not substantially
more liberal than incumbent women; however, the new women were more liberal than the





































































● ● ●New Democrats Retiring Democrats Returning Democrats
Figure 4.12: Average Ideology of New, Retiring, and Returning Democratic
Women
This figure plots the average ideology on all votes by Congress for freshman Democratic women,
returning Democratic women, and Democratic women leaving at the end of the congress due to
retiring, losing reelection, or running for higher office.
14A third possible explanation for understanding the 103rd Congress is perhaps the women who served in
both the 102nd and 103rd congresses shifted their attitudes and started voting more liberally on women’s
issues. Comparing ideology scores between the two congresses, I do not find much support for this potential
explanation, as individual lawmakers tend to be consistent in how they vote across time (Poole 2007).
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In Figure 4.12, I plot the average ideology on all votes for freshman, non-freshman,
and retiring Democratic women in each congress. I do not find much evidence that new
Democratic women are more liberal than non-freshman Democratic women. However, I do
find that overall Democratic women who retire tend to be more moderate. In seven of the
12 plotted congresses, retiring Democratic women are more moderate than both freshman
and non-freshman Democratic women. The 109th Congress is a bit misleading to this trend
as only one Democratic women retired that year. The 111th Congress was a big year for
retirements with 15 Democratic women retiring, who on average were much more moderate
than Democratic women who stayed in the chamber. Overall, this seems to suggest that the
replacement of retiring moderate women with more ideologically extreme women played a
role in both parties in understanding why gender differences have changed over time.
4.5.2 Explanation: Is it a Changing Agenda?
For both parties, I find some evidence that driving the diminishing effect of gender on
roll call voting is the replacement of more moderate retiring women with more ideologically
extreme women on both sides. However, I also expect a changing political agenda may have
contributed to the dwindling influence of gender. In the early 1990s, both Republican and
Democratic women voted more liberal than their male co-partisans on women’s issues, but
in the 2010s, gender no longer predicts voting behavior on women’s issues. Therefore, in
addition to how the composition of the women who serve has changed, I examine how the
political agenda around women’s issues has shifted.
In looking at Democratic women changes in the 1990s, I find women became more liberal
from the 102nd to the 103rd Congress, especially on women’s issues. This may be in part
due to a changing political agenda. The 1992 election highlighted women’s issues, and this
political focus translated into women’s issues capturing a larger portion of the legislation
agenda in the 103rd Congress. For example, in the 102nd Congress, there were a combine 64
votes on civil rights, health, and education bills, but in the 103rd Congress there were nearly
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double that with 115 votes on these women’s issue policy topics. The 103rd Congress saw the
passage of major women’s issue legislation, including the Family and Medical Leave Act and
amendments that expanded access to breast and cervical cancer preventative care. Looking
across parties, both Republican and Democratic women in the 103rd Congress voted more
liberal than their male co-partisans on women’s issues, highlighting some bipartisan efforts
between women to prioritize and pass significant women’s issue legislation.
Looking at how women’s issues have changed over time, I compare my subtopic coded
women’s issues in the 103rd Congress to those in the 114th Congress and find some substan-
tive differences, especially related to the issue of abortion. In the 103rd Congress, lawmakers
voted on 34 women’s issue bills of which only 6% were explicitly about abortion. However,
fast-forward to the 114th Congress and legislators voted on 22 women’s issue bills, of which
50% were related to abortion. This included a bill banning federal funding for abortion
and legislation stopping funding to Planned Parenthood. This is an important shift that
demonstrates an overall trend in the changing political agenda. Voting on women’s issues in
the 103rd Congress included bills on family leave and strengthening protections for victims
of domestic violence, which are issues where one might expect more bipartisan support from
women lawmakers. However, abortion is one of the most divisive partisan issues in today’s
politics (Wolbrecht 2010). An agenda that has shifted toward issues that are more partisan
and away from those more likely to highlight gender differences means roll call votes are less
likely to demonstrate any notable differences between men and women of the same political
party. Therefore, I find some evidence that two factors are both at play in explaining my
findings. The effect of gender on voting has changed over time in part due to moderate
women being replaced by more ideologically extreme women and a changing political agenda
that highlights partisan differences as the expense of gender differences.
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4.6 Discussion
Using more than 22,000 congressional roll call votes, this project provides new insight into
how women in Congress differ from their men colleagues. By addressing the shortcomings
of past methodological approaches, this paper provides insight into how gender differences
in Congress vary across party, issue, and time. I find support for my expectation that while
women in Congress in decades prior used to vote more liberal than their male co-partisans,
this trend has diminished over time due to polarization. Republican women more strongly
demonstrate this trend, as asymmetric polarization of the GOP has increasingly encouraged
more homogenous voting among congressional Republicans, leaving little room for gender
differences to be observed in voting behavior. For Democratic women in the House, they
appear to have polarized more than Democratic men. Even in the most recent congresses,
Democratic women continue to vote significantly more liberal than their male colleagues.
Additionally, I find support that women’s voting records across time are most different than
their men co-partisans when it comes to legislation addressing women’s issues.
Past research on women in Congress has often only used interest group scores, which look
specifically at women’s issues, or use DW-NOMINATE, which is an aggregate measure of all
votes. By scaling members by policy topic, this project provides new insight into how some
policy topics, such as civil rights, tend to highlight policy preference differences between men
and women, while other policy issues, such as labor, are not significantly influenced by a
legislator’s gender identity. This project highlights that relying on established congressional
measurements may mask some of the variance in behavior and the importance of adopting
measurements that best address the research question at hand. In future research, acknowl-
edging that legislators are often not ideologically consistent and using scaling methods that
allow for a more nuanced understanding of legislators’ behavior can better help us address
policy specific research questions. This type of ideology measurement can be used to under-
stand how members of Congress differ by policy topic from their colleagues including African
Americans, Latinx, younger generations, parents, and other identities expected to impact a
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legislators’ perspective and policy preferences.
Furthermore, this line of research is important because women are increasingly running
for and winning seats in Congress, and this project provides insight into what difference
having more women in politics can have on the policymaking process. Popular media ac-
counts, especially in the wake of the 2018 elections and the record number of women elected
to Congress, highlighted the differences women make as they are increasingly present in
politics. While women likely play an important role in elevating women’s issues onto the
legislative agenda through sponsorships and speaking on these issues, this project highlights
how polarization and party control have limited the number of opportunities for women to
differ from their men colleagues, especially when it comes to the final stages of the policy-
making process.
This project also pushed back against the stereotype that Republican women are more
liberal than Republican men. Past research finds that voters often stereotype Republican
women as more liberal, which is an electoral obstacle for Republican women, especially in
primaries (King & Matland 2003, McDermott 1998). While Republican women in the general
public may be more liberal than Republican men, I find the same is not true for Republican
women who win seats in Congress. This stereotype of Republican women being more liberal
does not actually hold up in recent congresses, as the voting records of GOP women that
seek and win seats in Congress are not significantly different than their male colleagues.
This also signifies that the types of Republican women in Congress are not representative of
Republican women in general, highlighting the current electoral challenges for more moderate
GOP women seeking political office.
A limitation of this project is that its scope is restricted to only the House of Represen-
tatives. Future research on gender and Congress should examine if similar trends exist in
the Senate. The U.S. Senate has certainly polarized; however, because the power of party
leadership to control the agenda is different than the House, there may be some interest-
ing differences between chambers. However, I acknowledge the challenges of replicating this
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study in the Senate due to the small sample of women who have ever served in the Senate.
The research question of this project was to examine gender differences across time, party,
and policy issues. I offer potential explanations for why these gender effects exists and have
diminished, but acknowledge this project is limited in providing a thorough exploration and
test of these ideas. I encourage future research that examines how the congressional agenda
has shifted and if the types of policies that are most likely to divide legislators along gender
are increasingly less likely to receive a floor vote.
Finally, we know district attributes and constituents influence members of Congress, and
that some districts are more or less likely to elect women lawmakers. In my analysis, I account
for some general measure of district demands; however, I recognize I cannot hold constant all
differences between congressional districts. I acknowledge that perhaps women are getting
elected from different types of districts than men and that this is what makes their voting
behavior different, rather than their personal gender identity. I would suggest that because
I find gender differences most prominent on women’s issues, it does at least to some degree
appear to be a gender effect, rather than just overall more liberal or conservative districts
which women lawmakers represent. Additionally, the recent influx of women in Congress
actually now allows for this type of analysis – to examine if a male lawmaker replaced by
a woman lawmaker representing the same district behavior similarly, or if, when holding
district-level differences constant, gender differences persist. I encourage future research


































Figure 4.13: House Number of Votes Used for Scaling
Note: This figure displays the distribution by policy topic of the number of votes in each session of
the House of Representatives that were not unanimous, and were therefore, included in the Bayesian
IRT process to produce legislators’ ideal points by policy topic. The mean and median number of














































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.14: House Ideology Scores Correlations with DW-NOMINATE
Note: This figure presents a Pearson correlation matrix that compares DW-NOMINATE scores against
my policy specific Bayesian IRT ideology scores. As expected, my ideology measure that uses all votes,
by Congress, is highly correlated with DW-NOMINATE at 0.94. For specific policy topics, some
correlate more highly with DW-NOMINATE than others. For example, economy and government
operations correlate the most with DW-NOMINATE and foreign trade and agriculture correlate the
least with DW-NOMINATE. Looking at just the 20 policy topics from the Policy Agendas Project,
my ideology measures on average correlate with DW-NOMINATE at 0.86.
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